Introduction

The notes here reproduced belong to the early period of Marshall’s life, when first metaphysics, and a little later mental philosophy - the forerunner of psychology - were his main interests:

My zeal for economics would never have me got out of bed at five o’clock in the morning, to make my own coffee and work for three hours before breakfast and pupils in mathematics: but philosophy did that till I became ill and my right foot swelled to double its normal size. That was in 1867. Soon after, I drifted away from metaphysics towards psychology. [...] I always said till about 1871 that my home was in Mental Science.

With the minutes of the Grote Club meetings (Raffaelli 1996), these notes can be read as a sort of appendix to the ‘Philosophical writings’ (Raffaelli 1994). Together these three manuscripts make up the surviving documents preserved in the Marshall Archive that directly attest Marshall’s early penchant for philosophy, except for the annotations on his copies of the books he read. At some unknown date, the notes were made up into a hard-cover book, which was later dismantled. Mary lent it to Claude Guillebaud in 1938, with the recommendation to return it to the Marshall Library when he had finished with it.

The notes are a collection of separate bundles and do not form a single and coherent whole. Almost all the notes seem to belong to 1867, as can be inferred from the many quotations from reviews (even a daily newspaper) of that year. However, quite strangely, the list of books on p. 25 of the manuscript bears the annotation may/1869.

Philosophy must here be taken in a wide and loose meaning, since, besides many references to philosophical works properly speaking, there are sayings, annotations and quotations on several subjects, mainly psychology, history, and religion, sometimes verging on ghostology, so much so that, looking for the sources of some passages on Google, I have been redirected to many a New Age website. The most difficult task has been to trace the many books and articles which are referred to, explicitly or implicitly; a task which in some cases was unsuccessful.

Only few statements can be attributed to Marshall himself, and we are left with a feeling of doubt on what he thought of the opposing positions he lists. This is particularly true with regard to a priori knowledge and self-consciousness, as dealt with by Hamilton, Bain, Mill and Spencer, who are among the most often quoted authors. These authors’ works, as well as those by Ferrier, Grote, Maudsley, Sidgwick, Mansel and others, which also figure in the notes, were all written in the 1850s and 1860s. Marshall looks at them with the eyes of a young curious apprentice philosopher, struggling with the updated version of basic philosophical controversies, without neglecting the old masters, as proved by quotations from Kant, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hamilton’s edition of Dugald Stewart. The scenario is typically insular, as the many references to Buckle’s History of Civilization in England confirm. Foreign authors are usually quoted second-hand, mainly from Hamilton. A notable exception is Kant, whose prominent position in Marshall’s philosophical studies is confirmed by his later reminiscences, as quoted by Keynes: ‘Kant my guide, the only man I ever worshipped’ (Pigou 1925 pp. 10-11). References to Bastiat, Descartes, Cicero and Condillac seem to be taken from works in the original language. If we add two translated quotations from Machiavelli, the list of non-British primary sources is complete. No trace yet of Hegel’s Philosophy of History, whose later influence has been documented by Cook (2005, 2008).

Though the whole of the manuscript, by itself, does not add very much to the picture, the fact itself that it was preserved among Marshall’s writings shows that it was of some value, maybe only affective. No single connecting thread runs through the notes, and, given their lack of unity, I
thought it is sufficient, when useful, to point out some connections with the ‘Philosophical writings’ and to make a few comments in the footnotes. In the edition of the ‘Philosophical writings’, I made ample reference to these notes and transcribed ‘Man and beast’ in footnote 33 of the introduction, and the note titled ‘Poetry’ in the appendix. The law of parcimony - the title of the first philosophical paper - is mentioned on p. 4 and 6 of the manuscript; Ferrier’s dualistic philosophy is referred to in Miscellaneous quotations; traces of ‘Ye machine’ can be detected in various passages. In previous writings I have advanced an interpretation of Marshall’s philosophical journey from Ferrier towards a mix of evolutionary and Hegelian monism, to which I still adhere, but its beginnings are not to be found in these notes. Their main interest lies in helping to form an idea of the range of studies the young Marshall cultivated, and of how seriously he approached relevant philosophical issues of his time.

1. I wish to thank Simon Cook, Carlo Cristiano and Tiziana Foresti for their help in bringing this work to an end.
3. Lists of Marshall’s own philosophical books that can be consulted in Cambridge libraries are given in the appendix. Not surprisingly, Marshall’s disliked the excessively polemical attitude of the books he read. For instance, he defended Hamilton against Mill’s criticism (notes on An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy) and on the other side he rebuked Grote for his attack on Utilitarianism (notes on An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy). He thought that in both cases, a more sympathetic reading of the authors under examination would have made it unnecessary to polemize.
4. Cf. also Scott (1924, pp. 448-49) and the note titled ‘Poetry’, below.

Bibliography

Meditanda [1-16]

[1-2]
The abstract of [all] sequences is Time
The abstract of [all] coexistences is Space.²

A belief which is proved by the inconceivability of its negation to invariably exist is true. Mill’s criticism thereon. Why not go straight to experience. What is the use of inconceivability.³

Reality is persistence in consciousness.⁴ NB this is another form of the Universal Postulate.⁵

In ‘unconscious mental modifications’ - or in actions which we remember to have performed while at the time unconscious of them - how about self-consciousness?⁶

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¹ Numbers in square brackets indicate the page number of the manuscript, subdivided into sections, with the titles given in bold letters. Individual page numbers are also given when it seemed to be useful. Some of the books here referred to are in the Marshall Library Archive, some others were given by Marshall to the Philosophy Library. In the University Library there are two lists of Marshall’s books that include philosophical books. They were probably transferred to UL from the Marshall Library. Simon Cook kindly provided me with these three lists. A two-page document in Marshall’s own handwriting lists the books he gave to the Moral Science Board in October 1905. They are now in the Philosophy Library. The lists are given in the appendix.


³ The passage refers to the different views of Mill and Spencer (the latter in agreement on this with Hamilton and other idealist philosophers) on the possibility of a priori knowledge (see below, note 5).

⁴ ‘By reality we mean persistence in consciousness’; Spencer, First Principles, p. 160. Reality of the external world is an instance of necessary truth ‘proved by the inconceivability of its negation’ (see note below).

⁵ Spencer’s Universal Postulate states that ‘a belief which is proved by the inconceivability of its negation to invariably exist, is true’. ‘The Universal Postulate’ is the title of an article published by Spencer in 1853 in the Westminster Review (vol. LX, pp. 513-50) and taken up again in the 1st edition of Principles of Psychology (1855). Mill replied in the 4th edition of System of Logic (1856), denying any exception to the experience hypothesis. (Some of the relevant passages are annotated in Marshall’s own copy of this edition. Marshall also owned the 6th and the 7th editions, the latter heavily annotated. All three are in the Cambridge University Library). Neither of the two wanted to emphasize the contrast, as Spencer recognized the provisional nature of the truths derived from his principle (what is inconceivable today, may become conceivable tomorrow), unlike the intuitionist philosophers, such as Whewell and Hamilton, who were Mill’s target. However, the controversy went on till the 7th edition of Mill’s System of Logic (1868) and the 2nd edition of Spencer’s Principles of Psychology (1872).
Method by which having observed a sequence we argue ye different degrees of certainty with which from a single instance a law can be argued.

Contrivances in connexion with instinct. eg by Bees in anomalous hive. How far connected with the fact that contrivance of one kind may be due to fortuitous associations.?

[3]

D. Stewart

VII, pp. 284-5

a generally and tending to approximate to Utilitarianism

p. 355: Hobbes calls it a habit; but his doing so is a necessary portion of the form of his doctrine: in fact this is one of the many instances of the Utilitarian “obliquities” of D. Stewart.10

[4]

Law of Parcimony applied. Bain S&E 637. My plan has been to exhibit what seemed to me the genesis of the notion (of Space and Time); and if that is satisfactory to the reader, an à priori origin is disproved by being superseded.11
Conf. ib. p. 638 and Bailey, Letters on the Mind Series I p. 72

Anticipatio naturae. Bacon

See generally Buckle on Reid

Locke II, p. 150 etc.

Lewes History of Philosophy p. 76 Nil posse creari e nihilo

Hamilton Lectures I 51 155 170

The conditions of consciousness Lect XI

p 217 no use for Memory

Mill on Hamilton 197

endorses Bain’s position as it is stated in the sentence transcribed by Marshall: ‘Mr Bain’s doctrine being as consistent with the admitted facts of the case as Sir W. Hamilton’s, has a good claim, on his own Law of Parsimony to be preferred to it’ (Mill J. S., An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, London, Longman & Co., 1865, p. 245). Marshall owned both the 1865 (2 copies) and the 1867 editions. The copy of the 1865 edition now in the Marshall Library is heavily annotated. See Raffaelli 1994, p. 62, 75 and note 99.


13. Henry Thomas Buckle’s History of Civilization in England (2 volumes, London, Parker, Son and Bourne, 1857-61) deals with Reid in the chapter on the Scottish intellect during the eighteenth century (vol. II, pp. 474-86), and his conclusion is that Reid’s philosophy ‘comes under the head of what Bacon stigmatized as the anticipatio naturae, and which he deemed the great enemy of knowledge’ (p. 485). Marshall owned the Longman 1867 edition of the book in 3 volumes, and his book is now in the Marshall library, but quotations of pages scattered through the manuscript certainly come from the earlier edition.


16. The passages referred to are taken from vol. I of W. Hamilton’s Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic (ed. by H.L. Mansel and J. Veitch, 4 volumes, Edinburgh, Blackwood & Sons, 1860-62) and contain general and introductory philosophical remarks: p. 51, various different definitions of philosophy in antiquity; p. 155, philosophical mistakes concerning the relation between substance and phenomenon; p. 170, conditions of permissible hypotheses (a. existence of the phenomenon to be explained, b. impossibility of explaining the phenomena otherwise than by a hypothesis).


18. The expression ‘no use for memory’ is in a long quotation from Reid’s criticism of Locke, who takes memory to be consciousness whereas, according to Reid, when there is consciousness there is ‘no use for memory’ (Hamilton, Lectures, I, p. 217).
Fundamental tendencies of the human mind

To connect causes with effects | Hamilton Lectures on Metaphysics I, 66
where see numerous references
to carry up our knowledge into unity

Wonder Hamilton Lectures I 77

To assimilate in opinions and habits of thought to those with whom we live and act
Hamilton Lectures I 84

‘It is only by a law of thought which compels us to think something, absolute and unknown as
the basis or condition of the relative and known, that this something obtains a kind of
incomprehensible reality to us’

Bain Senses & Intellect Parimony

84) In the proper place I hope to be able to show that without this spontaneity of our actions
the growth of volition or of activities guided to ends is all but inexplicable

116. Consciousness of mental energy distinguished from muscular energy.

19. Mill invokes the law of parcimony to maintain that if we can avoid introducing a new original principle of
human nature, and can explain the phenomena through known causes, we are obliged to do so (Mill,
Examination, 2nd ed., p. 197).
20. ‘Of the former class, - that is, of the essential causes [of philosophy], - there are in all two: the one is, the
necessity we feel to connect Causes with Effects; the other, to carry up our knowledge into unity’ (Hamilton,
Lectures, I, p. 66).
21. ‘Besides these intellectual necessities [of refunding effects into their causes ... and of carrying up our
knowledge into unity or system] ... there is another powerful subsidiary to the same effect, - in a certain
affection of our capacities of feeling. This feeling, according to circumstances, is denominated surprise,
astonishment, admiration, wonder; and when blended with the intellectual tendencies we have considered, it
obtains the name of curiosity’ (Hamilton, Lectures, I, p. 77).
22. ‘The existence of society, from a family to a state, supposes a certain harmony of sentiment among its
members; and nature has, accordingly, wisely implanted in us a tendency to assimilate in opinions and habits of
thought to those with whom we live and act’ (Hamilton, Lectures, I, p. 84)
344 ‘Where should a past feeling be reembodied if not in the same organ as the feeling when present?’[1]26

[7]
It may be said, and there not wanting those who appear very much disposed to say, if not totidem verbis, at least by strong implication that the conception of Force itself as part and parcel of the material system of the Universe is superfluous and therefore illogical.

John Herschel On Origin of Force27

[8]

Mathematical axioms
Space enclosed by st[raight] lines
Mansel Prole.[gomena] 100 Q[uated]d in M[ill] on H[amilton] 26828

[9]

Man and Beast29

Cessation of ideas leads man to seek the both consequences and causes of events, brutes only to seek causa consequences30.

Hobbes, Lev[iathan] ch. III
yet Brutes have prudence, ib[idaem]31
see also p. 11.

28. Mill, Examination, p. 268: Mill quotes Mansel on the radical difference between the conception of a centaur and that of a space enclosed by two straight lines. We have no difficulty in imagining the former, while the latter is inconceivable. Mill’s explanation is that the centaur, unlike the space enclosed by straight lines, is a combination of experiences which can be imagined by association.
29. See Raffaelli, 1994, p. 63. ‘Man and Beast’ is reproduced in footnote 34.
30. Hobbes (Leviathan, London, A. Crooke, 1651) maintains that to seek the causes from ‘an effect imagined’ ‘is common to man and beast’, while to ‘seek all the possible effects’ of an imagined thing is a ‘train of thought’ ‘of which I have not at any time seen any sign, but in man only’. Marshall’s annotated copy of the 1st edition of Leviathan is now in the Cambridge University Library.
31. ‘It is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast’.

7
B[rutes] cannot reason by languages ib[iddem], p. 20

B[rutes] can deliberate and will p. 28

Distinguished by desire of knowledge p. 26

and by admiration of novelty p. 26

N. B. He [Hobbes] seems right in seeing that the pleasure is peculiar [to man]; the sense of novelty not.

(N. B. See Fleming on Laughter)

(N. B. For Self-consciousness see Ferrier: Institutes, p. 271-2)

B[rutes] Have Memory but no art of induction: no experience; Aristotle, quoted by Lewes (See Descartes Med[itationes], II (p. 33)

Expectation as opposed to objective a priori necessity allowed them, Kant Pr.[aktischen]Vern.[unft]Vorr.[ede] 116

[10]

Unthinkable

Hobbes Lev[iathan] p. 11. 19.20

32. ‘If speech be peculiar to man, as for ought I know it is, then is understanding peculiar to him also’. The passage is on p. 17, not 20.

33. ‘Beasts, that have deliberation, must also have will’.

34. ‘Desire to know why, and how, CURIOSITY ... is in no living creature but man’.

35. ‘Admiration’ [that is: ‘joy, from apprehension of novelty’] is ‘proper to man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause’.

36. Fleming W., The Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral and Metaphysical, London, Richard Griffin & Co., 1857: laughter ‘has been thought peculiar to man, as that which distinguishes him from the inferior animals’ (p. 283).

37. Ferrier J. F., Institutes of Metaphysic; The Theory of Knowing and Being, 2nd ed., Edinburgh and London, W. Blackwood & Sons 1856, pp. 271-72: ‘If the inferior animals have no cognisance of themselves - and there is good reason to believe they have none, although no opinion is here offered on this point -, in that case, with all their senses, they are mere incarnate absurdities, gazing upon unredeemed contradiction’ (see below).

38. ‘The distinction between Brutes and Men is that the former, although they have Memory, have no Experience; that is to say, have not the art which converts Memory into Experience – the art of Induction’. Lewes, History of Philosophy, p. 292. The passage is followed by a quotation from Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

39. Descartes R., Meditationes de Prima Philosophia: ‘Quid fuit in prima perceptione distinctum? Quid quod non a quovis animali haberi posse videtur? At vero ... non possum sine humana mente percipere’.

40. ‘We must not say of something which often or always follows a certain antecedent state, that we can conclude from this to that (for this would imply objective necessity and the notion of an à priori connexion), but only that we may expect similar cases (just as animals do), that is, that we reject the notion of cause altogether as false and a mere delusion’, Kant I., Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft, Leipzig, Modes und Baumann 1838, p. 107-08. Preface (Vorrede) to Part II (‘Critical examination of practical reason’). It was not possible to trace the edition from which the quotation is taken.

41. ‘The name of God is used, not to make us conceive him (for he is incomprehensible; and his greatness and power are uncomceivable)’ (Leviathan, p. 11). ‘Words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound are those we
Conf the addition drum ib. p. 18

[11]

No title

Self-consciousness. Bain S[enses]&I[ntellect]

449 = power of introspection
= Locke’s Reflection. 43

The Self, the I, is recognized in every act of intelligence as the subject to which that act belongs. Ham Lect I 166 44

See also 193. 203 45

[12]

Sir W. H.s Lect on M

[13]

Essays on Reform

call Absurd, Insignificant and Non-sense. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a round Quadrangle; or accidents of Bread in Cheese; or Immaterial Substances; or of A free Subject; A free-Will; or any Free, but free from being hindered in opposition, I should not say he were in an Error, but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd. [...] But this privilege [the privilege to enquire into the consequences of anything he conceives and ‘by words to reduce the consequences he finds to general Rules, called Theorems, or Aphorismes’], is allayed by another; and that is the privilege of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man only’ (Leviathan 19-20).

42. ‘When a man reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from addition of parcels; or conceive a remainder, from subtraction of one sum from another’.

43. This is the relevant passage in Ferrier’s Proposition One (Raffaelli 1994, p. 108): ‘Bain’s definition of self-consciousness is eminently characteristic. “The taking cognizance,” he says, “of the facts of our own mind as phenomena to be known and studied is one of the meanings of the name consciousness. A better designation is self-consciousness or the power of introspection” [Bain, The Senses and the Intellect, p. 449]. And in order to make his meaning yet clearer he says: “Locke applies the term Reflection to this operation”. ... yet as Bain has introduced the illustration it will be as well to quote Locke’s exact words: he defines it as “the perception of the operations of our own mind within us as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider them, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without” [Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book II, chapter I, paragraph 4, in Works, 1801, vol. I, p. 78]’.

44. ‘The Self, the I, is recognised in every act of intelligence, as the subject to which that act belongs ... In English the I could not be tolerated ... The term Self is more allowable’ (Hamilton, Lectures, I, pp. 166-67). The passage is quoted in Ferrier’s proposition One (Raffaelli 1994, p. 107).

45. “Though the simplest act of mind, consciousness thus expresses a relation subsisting between two terms. These terms are, on the one hand, an I or Self, as the subject of a certain modification, - and, on the other, some modification, state, quality, affection, or operation belonging to the subject’ (Hamilton, Lectures, I, p. 193).
5. If any measure dictate of political justice were sanctioned by the reason and conscience of mankind it would of course be ipso facto beneficial. But any thing like household suffrage would be opposed to some of the principles laid down of p. 15. In fact I do not see that there are any maxims of political justice which are approved (I do not say always by every one) but always and under all circumstances by any one.

[14]

Ye laws of nature

“Let it be left to practical experimentalists still to supply their rough approximations and to mathematicians to accumulate the theoretical evidence which a long-elaborated calculation will enable them to derive from imag seek for the in the imaginary experiments which every are involved in almost every step of an elaborate analysis for tests far more accurate subtle than we can conceive to be given by any of their methods, far tests almost indefinitely subtle but never absolutely exact[“].

[15]

“Had this opinion been only advocated by members of the despised race of metaphysicians I should have had more hesitation in engaging in a task which would have been by so many people contemptuously compared to that of laboriously cudgelling a shadow”.

[16]

Faculties of the Human Mind

Sense of self-consciousness  H[amilton Lect.[ure] I

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46 Brodrick G.C., ‘The Utilitarian argument against reform, as stated by Mr. Lowe’, in Essays on Reform, London, Macmillan, 1867. The passage has not been traced. A related passage is on p. 5 of Brodrick’s book: ‘Real facts are more trustworthy than the dictates of political justice: but the dictates of political justice, so far as they are warranted by our knowledge of human nature, and sanctioned by the reason and conscience of mankind, are more trustworthy than hypothetical facts’.

47 This and the following quotation have not been traced.
In performing many actions and in taking part in many conversations an irresistible (but generally erroneous) conviction arises that the same scene has been passed through before under the same circumstances; and the same words having been frequently used on both occasions.

Hudson\textsuperscript{50} has not only remarked this himself, but says that every one to whom he has talked on the subject has done the same.

Question. Is this experience very common, and how far is the ‘conviction’ ‘erroneous’?

See Misc Quot.ns p. 1\textsuperscript{51}

Our diarists could only tell us how many \textit{yards} long the comets seemed to be.

\textbf{Chambers Annals of Scotland}\textsuperscript{52}

\begin{itemize}
\item My hand had been supporting my chin. I put it to my forehead and had the sensation of intense warmth. My first impression was that my forehead was warm. But I speedily perceived that it was my hand which was strikingly hot. I however did not feel comfortable till I had verified this by putting my hand to my chin and again to my forehead.

\item to be accounted for by the fact that when I put my hand in that position to ascertain any thing about warmth it is generally my forehead that is the subject of observation
\end{itemize}

\begin{flushright}
\textbf{T.W.}\textsuperscript{49} [17-20]
\end{flushright}

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\textsuperscript{49} This most probably stands for Terse Writings.

\textsuperscript{50} Hudson William Henry H. (1838-1915), St John’s, admitted 1857, 3\textsuperscript{rd} wrangler 1861, Fellow 1862; Mathematical Lecturer, St Catherine’s College, Cambridge, 1862-1863, 1867-1868 and St John’s College, Cambridge, 1869-1881; Professor of Mathematics, King’s College, London, 1882-1903 and Queen’s College, London, 1883-1905.

\textsuperscript{51} See below note 129.

Bonney looked at a man whose head was turned completely away from him. He turned round, and in explanation said that he could always feel when another was looking at him. Even this is not conclusive testimony that the ‘feeling’ operates when the eyes of the looker are behind those of the looked. This particular case might have been accidental

Do watchmakers acquire a habit of soft breathing so as not to disturb the steadiness of their fingers: particularly in cases in which many generations have been watchmakers?

Water was flowing steadily out of a pipe (that connecting ye Johnian and Trinity ditches). Two boys age about 10 12 were looking at it. One of them remarked: ‘I should think a bucketful came out each time’. The other assented

When putting away books and before going to bed my eye fell on my watch lying on the table. The thought passed through my mind that I must take it into my room with me. I then closed a book with my left hand (my pocket kerchief was in my right) carefully putting a mark in it and thinking about using it next morning. Thus the idea of the watch was not present to my consciousness at all. When I turned from the book my attention was roused by the fact that my waistcoat watch pocket would contain no more of my kerchief. I had rammed half in.

NB I was not sleepy.

**Memoranda for Fleming [21-34]**

[21]

Mill - Volition D. St. VI 344


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53. Bonney Thomas G. (1833-1923), St John’s, 12th wrangler 1856, Fellow, College Tutor 1868-1876; Professor of Geology, University College, London, 1876-1901; President of the Geological Society, 1884-1886.

54. See Raffaelli 1994, p. 74 and n. 89.


56. What D. St. stands for is not clear to me.

57. Appendix C of Bain’s *The Senses and the Intellect*, ‘The germs and the development of volition’, quotes Spencer’s *Psychology* on the mechanical connection between actions which can explain ‘why certain movements, out of a great number happening, are retained by preference’; that is, become the object of volition.
Scepticism and Empiricism

Mill Fortnightly I 509

Excluded Middle Def

HS on M 535

Inconceivable

Association Mansel Metaphysics 239

Condillac p 51

[22]

Aristotle

Util: Utilitarianism

Butlers 3

Tugendlehre, Kant

Bentham

Bentham:

Butler:

Ferrier

Fischer

Bain

Mill Logic

Mansel Prolegomena

59. Here Marshall refers to the editor’s review of J. S. Mill’s An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, and of the Principal Question Discussed in his Writings, Fortnightly Review, 1, p. 509, where the reviewer quotes a long passage by Mill on sensation.
61. On pp. 51-2, Mansel criticizes Condillac’s hypothesis of the statue becoming conscious through sensation only.
Mill Polit[ical] Econ[omy]

[23]
1. Plato S om
2 S
3. P&S⁶³ omit
4 P. omit restriction

7 Whole of Stewart S&P
8. System Mor[ality] for P&S
9. Blue Book
   Mackintosh dissertation [on the progress of ethical philosophy ] P&S
   Represent[ative] Gov.[ernment] S

[24]

M[oral] and P[olitical] Philosophy

1 Plato Rep[ublic]
2 Arist[otle] Ethics
3 Cicero De off[iciis]
4 Butler 3 Sermons
5 Kant Einleitung in die Methaphysik der Sitten
6 Kant Tugendlehre
7 Stewart Out[lines] & Moral Powers Bks I II
8 Whewell Elements of morality
9 Bentham Principles of morals & legislation & of Civil Code

Mental Philo[sophy]

Descartes Discourse de la Methode

⁶³ P and S probably stand for Primary and Secondary, and refer to the reading lists of the two classes of students (I owe this interpretation to Simon Cook).
Locke Essay Bks I II IV
Cousin on Kant
on Locke
Hamilton Lect[ures] on Met[aphysics]
Ferrier Inst[itutes] of Met[aphysic]
Bain S[enses]&I[ntellect]

[25]

Subjects of […]^{64} may/69

D. Stewart Act[ive] & Mor.[al] Pow[ers]

Mill's Logic Whately Logic
Mansel Prole[egomena] Log[ica]


Inst.[itutes] of Met.[aphysic]

[26]

Logic

Mansel Prole.gomena Log[ica]
Hamilton Lectures on Log[ic]
Whately Elements of Logic
Thomson Laws of Thought
Bacon Nov.[um] Org.[anum]
Whewell Nov[um] Org.[anon] Renovatum^{66}

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^{64} Illegible word. It could be ‘a sale’.
^{65} It should be Harmonies économiques.
Mill System of Logic

Pol.[itical] Econ[onomy]

Adam Smith The Wealth
Mill Pol[itical] Econ[omy]
Cairnes Character & Logical Method of Pol.[itical] Econ[omy]
Bastiat Harmonies Economiques

Terse Sayings [27-35]

Frederick the Great lost the battle of Jena

F[ortnightly] 35 523

There is some one who is more able than Talleyrand, more able than Napoleon c’est tout le monde

Ib p. 527

Men […] learned to seek the how instead of the why

When you know nothing place Terrors.

Helps, speaking of savage nations (Bain E[motions]&W[ill] 62)

The mothers’ faith in the child passes every other form of ‘credulity’

67 ‘We have all heard the saying that “Frederic the Great lost the battle of Jena.” It was the system which he had established - a good system for his wants and his times, — which, blindly adhered to, and continued into a different age, put to strive with new competitors, brought his country to ruin’. Bagehot, W. ‘The English Constitution: on changes of ministry’, *Fortnightly Review*, 6, n. 35, 1866 pp. 513-37 (p. 523).
69 Illegible word. It could be ‘had’.
The love of contradiction & a fondness for paradox are modifications of the irascible feeling

Dr Johnson's definition of genius - Large general powers operating in a particular direction.
Conf ‘A man can walk as far east as he can west’.

Humanity is the virtue of a woman, generosity of a man

A. Smith lays down as the criterion of right ‘The sympathetic feeling of the impartial and well informed spectator’

Sir J. Mackintosh got great credit for saying ‘constitution are not made but grown’. In our day the most significant thing about this saying was [is] that it was thought so significant

A small ray of truth has seemed brilliant, as a distant rushlight looks like a star in the surrounding darkness

Achilles was committed to a centaur

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Be a good hypocrite; you will never want dupes. Seem mild, courteous religious sincere. Be so, now and then, if you can78

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ότι} & \quad \text{historical} \\
\text{γνώσις} & \quad \text{έστι} \\
\text{διότι} & \quad \text{philosophical}
\end{align*}
\]

Hamilton Lectures on Metaphysics I 5879

There are two essential - causes of philosophy

(i) the necessity we feel to connect causes with effects (ii) to carry up our knowledge into unity

(ii) ib 6680

Omnis pulchritudinis forma unitas est

S. Augustin Epistulae XVIII81

The child is wholly absorbed in the contemplation of the world without. The world within first engages the contemplation of the man. As it is with the individual, so was it with the species

Hamilton Lectures on Metaphysics I 8082

Opinion Imagination disposes all things: it constitutes beauty, justice, happiness: & these are the all in all of the world

Pascal Pensées I VI 383

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78. Free rendering from the same chapter.
79. ‘And as the Greek language, expresses historical knowledge by the \text{ότι} - the \text{γνώσις} \text{έστι}; so well it expresses philosophical knowledge by the \text{διότι} - the \text{γνώσις} \text{διότι} \text{έστι}’ (Hamilton, Lectures, I, p. 58)
81. The quotation is taken from an editorial footnote to Hamilton, (Lectures, I, p. 69). Hamilton’s editors, H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch, add to various ‘testimonies to the love of unity’, St Augustin’s application of the principle of Unity to explain Beauty.
82. Hamilton, Lectures, I, 80. The original text is ‘absorbed in the observation ...’.
83. The passage from Pascal (Pensées, partie I art. vi § 3) is taken from Hamilton (Lectures, I, p. 89). The editors, H. L. Mansel and J. Veitch, explain that Pascal’s original text had ‘imagination’ and was restored by Faugère.
Every opinion is strong enough to have had its martyrs

Montaigne

O doxa, doxa, quam es communis noxa

Luther

Mr Lincoln answered well Frederick the Great’s definition of a Prince - ‘the first of subjects’. His confidence in them was as simple & unhesitating as his loyalty was perfect

Conway in F[ortnightly]y Review

The attention of the intellect is a natural prayer by which we obtain the enlightenment of reason

Malebranche, Q[uote]d by Ham[ilton] L[ectures] I, 260

A board is a screen

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84. The passage from Montaigne (Essays, liv. I, ch. 40) is quoted by Hamilton (Lectures, I, p. 89).
85. Another quotation taken from Hamilton (Lectures, I, p. 89).
87. The diagram, which is handwritten in the manuscript without modifications, is here taken from Hamilton, Lectures, I, p. 125.
88. ‘The soul is that by which primarily we live, perceive, and think’. Aristotle, De anima II.2, from Hamilton, Lectures, I p. 139 note gamma.
89. Malebranche, Traité de Morale, partie I, chap. v, § 4. The passage is quoted by Hamilton, Lectures, I, p. 260 to prove the paramount importance of attention.
I may perceive distance by the eye as I may perceive a mail coach in the next street by the
sound of the horn

Bain E[motions]&W[ill] 584

To be under the eyes of others - to have to defend oneself to others - is never more important
than to those who act in opposition to the opinion of others, for it obliges them to have some
ground of their own. Nothing has so steadying an influence as working against pressure


‘The Prophets were in Church and State the equivalent of the modern liberty of the press’
‘just but not adequate


Every man is strong enough to enforce his conviction

Goethe

Next to exact knowledge there is nothing so instructive as exact error

Lewes

Time is The abstract of all sequences is Time. The abstract of all sequence coexistences is Space

Lewes Hist[ory] of Phil[osophy] new ed II 439

For motion produceth nothing but motion

Hobbes, Lev[iathan] Ch I

annotated, is in the Marshall Library, the 1865 edition is in the UL. Both were edited by Longman, Green & Co.,
London. Page numbers are the same.
93. This quotation is probably taken from the article ‘Chess’, Atlantic Monthly, 5 n. 32, June 1860, p. 671. ‘Is’ is
Marshall’s addition.
95. See above, note 2.
Madness when its origin is fairly examined always means discord between the individual and his circumstances

Maudsley, Ph[ysiology] & P.[athology] of Mind 15998

The profound epigram of Agassiz that the world in dealing with a new truth passes through three stages: it first says that is not true; than that it is contrary to religion: and finally that we knew it before

H. Sidgwick in MacMillan for 67 Art[icle] on Arnold99

Excerpts from the Talmud

Quarterly for Oct 67100

‘Scripture ordains that the Hebrew slave who “loves” his bondage shall have his ear piirced against the door post. Why? Because it is that ear wh. Heard on Sinai “They are my servants” … And the man voluntarily throws away his freedom. “Pierce his ear”. Even when the gates of prayer are shut in heaven, those of tears are open.

When the righteous die it is the earth that loses. The lost jewel will always be a jewel, but the possessor who has lost it – well may he weep.

Even the most righteous shall not attain to so high a place in heaven as the truly repentant.

Iron breaks the stone, fire melts iron, water extinguishes fire, the clouds drink up the water, storm drives away the clouds, man withstands the storm, fear unmans man, wine dispels fear, sleep drives away wine, and death sweeps all away -even sleep. But Solomon the wise says “Charity saveth from death”

Descend a step in choosing a wife, mount a step in choosing a friend.

97. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 3
Get your living by skinning carcases in the street, and do not say I am a priest, I am a great man; this work would not befit my dignity.

Use a noble vase even for one day – let it break tomorrow

Teach thy tongue to say, I do not know

Who is strong? He who subdues his passions. Who is rich? He who is satisfied with his lot.

The writer says Moses saw everything clearly; the other prophets as in dark mirror. He goes on to quote -

‘Ezekiel and Isaiah say the same things, but Ezekiel like a town-bred man, Isaiah like a villager’.

Even for the sake of a babe the Sabbath may be broken for the babe will keep many a Sabbath yet for that one which was broken for it.

The Sabbath, says the writer, was ‘a day of joy and delight’, ‘a feast day’ and he quotes the adage ‘Better live on your Sabbath as you would on a week day than be dependent upon others.

The following also are adages -
Jerusalem was destroyed because the instruction of the young was neglected
The word is only saved by the breath of the school children
Even for the rebuilding of the Temple the schools must not be interrupted.

Study is more meritorious than sacrifice. A scholar is greater than a prophet.

The writer says – In the judgement on Sin the animus is taken into consideration. The desire to commit the vice is held to be more wicked than the vice itself.101

101. Here is the end of quotations from ‘The Talmud’.
Providence has given to the French the empire of the Land, to the English the Empire of the Sea; and to the Germans the empire of the Air.

Richter quoted by Carlyle

But when they stripped him of his ornaments it was the baubles lost their grace, not he

Spanish Gypsy

Children are afraid of being left in the dark: men are afraid of not being left in it.

Landor

Coleridge in lecturing said something of a democratic tendency. His audience expressed disapproval. ‘I am not surprised’ said he ‘that when the red hot prejudices of aristocrats are plunged into the cool element of reason they should go off with a hiss’.

‘Appear to have rather less wit than you have. A wise man will live as much within his wit as within his income

Chesterfield

Strip M-ajest-y of its externals and it becomes a jest.

Il faut beaucoup de philosophie pour observer ce qu’on voit tous les jours

Similes Metaphors & [36-45]

He shoked like a pole fixed in the rush of a tide.

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105. Lord P.D.S. Chesterfield, Letters to his son, 18.12.1765 to his godson.
106. Rousseau’s dictum is probably taken from chapter 1 of Bastiat’s Harmonies Économiques.
An earthquake accompanied by thunder and lightning going up express to London.

A Kentuckian wishing some government aid in recovering his slaves ‘reminded’ Lincoln ‘of a little story. When I was going down the Ohio in a steamer a little boy came up to the Captain and said “Captain, please stop the boat a little while; I’ve lost my apple overboard.”

As every additional part of a mechanical apparatus entails a loss of force, so does every syllogism entail a loss of certainty. As no machine can produce an equivalent to the moving power, so no argument can establish a conclusion equally certain with that primary knowledge on which all argument is based.

Man’s soul is at first one unvaried blank till it has received the impressions of external experience. Yet has this blank been already touched by a celestial hand, and when plunged in the colours which surround it, it takes not its tinge from accident but from design, and comes out covered with a glorious pattern.

The two systems of concentric circles w[hich] the shock given by Bentham and Coleridge [them] is spreading over the ocean of mind[,] have only just begun to meet and intersect.

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107. I was unable to trace this quotation.
Our philosophy was born about Bacon’s time, and Bacon’s name (as the brightest who presided at the time of its birth) has been inscribed upon it. Hesperus that led the starry host rode brightest. Not that Hesperus did actually lead the other stars, he and they were moving under a common force, and they would have moved just as fast if he had been away; but because he shone brightest, he looked as if he led them.

Spedding’s Bacon I 374.\(^{113}\)

As we see in the water through the wind cease the waves give not over rowling for a long time after; so also it happeneth in that motion which is made in this internal parts of a man, then, when he sees, dreams &c.

Hobbes Leviathan ch II\(^{114}\)

As when a master of a family, in taking an account, casteth up the sums of all the bills of expense into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account, nor what it is he pays for; he advantageth himself no more, than if he allowed the account in gross, trusting to every of the accountant’s skill and honesty: so also in reasoning of all other things, he that taketh up conclusions on the trust of authors, and does not fetch from the first items in every reasoning, which are the significations of names settled by definitions, loses his labour; and doth not know anything, but only believeth.

Hobbes ch 5

Corporations, which are as it were many lesser Commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man.

Hobbes Leviathan ch 29

It is with the mysteries of our Religion as with wholesome pills for the Sick, which swallowed whole have the virtue to cure; but chewed are for the most cast up again without effect


\(^{114}\) Hobbes, *Leviathan*, pp. 4-5.
The moral and political system of Hobbes was a palace of ice, transparent[,] exactly proportional[,] majestic, admired by the unwary as a delightful dwelling[,] but gradually undermined by the central warmth of human feeling, before it was thawed into muddy water by the sunshine of true philosophy

Mackintosh, History of the Revolution in England in 1688] 132\textsuperscript{115}

NB If pure ice thaws into muddy water the dirt must be supplied by the soil on which it rests (in this case “human feeling”)\textsuperscript{116}

Such opinions as are taken [onely] upon credit of antiquity are not intrinsically the judgments of those that cite them but words that pass (like gaping) from mouth to mouth.

Hobbes Leviathan conclusion

It is an argument of indigestion when Greek and Latin sentences unchewed come up again as they use to do unchanged.

Ib

In a large classes of diseases we have obviously a species of insolvency to be dealt with according to the sound method of readjusting the relations of expenditure and income. ... Drugs even in their happiest application can but guide and favour the restorative process; just as the stirring of the fire may make it burn provided there be the needful fuel.

Bain in M’millan 1867\textsuperscript{117}

The constitution of man is such that he can only remember that he has been in pain, he cannot remember the pain. The constitution of the world is such that it can only remember that it has been in error: it cannot remember the error, ie reconceive it.

Moreover the causes are similar

\textsuperscript{115} The page number corresponds to Mackintosh J., Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, A. and C. Black & Co, Edinburgh, 1836.
\textsuperscript{116} This is an odd and telling vindication of Hobbes, against Mackintosh’s dismissive remark.
Metaphysical ghosts cannot be killed because they cannot be touched; but they may be dispelled by dispelling the twilight in which shadows and solidities are easily confounded.

Lewes Hist of Phil I lxxxiv

It is with justice that the substance of Spinoza has been compared to the den of the lion wh.[ere] there are many steps to, but few from.

Schwegler p. 175

In the good glacier down with which we are slowly moving there broke out some time ago a certain chasm, and an intelligent man of those times, one Dr Paley, built a bridge over the same. The support for the further end of this bridge still remains: but further on there has broken out a greater chasm than the former. But its existence is mostly unknown. Those cautious Souls who go slowly across rest on the thin hedge on the other side. They mostly squat across it and so don’t fall: and they think they have done all. If one will go with headlong pace expecting the bridge to conduct him to a firm footing he mostly goes headlong down into the great chasm on the other side.

“Give your decisions boldly” said a celebrated lawyer to a layman who had been appointed governor of a colony “they will be mostly right. But never give your reasons: they will be always wrong.”

So with regard to popular beliefs of all kinds. It is true that the real affections of the brain which gave rise to a belief in ghosts do mostly occur after midnight. There is every reason for believing that real results could be obtained from psalmistry. And looking forward we may with confidence [believe] that whatever be its rationale, in the concrete Homoeopathy cannot be wholly false. So with regard to Phrenology.

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118. This and other similes and sentences, signed a m, are probably due to Marshall himself.
121. See above note 118.
“Philosophy is the servant of Theology” said some one. “Yes” said Kant “but the question is whether she is the torch bearer or the train bearer”\textsuperscript{123}


Q\textsuperscript{quote}ote\textsuperscript{d} in Lebahn’s Faust p. 422\textsuperscript{124}

The intense, lifefull, lifegiving, all producing energy of “Sinn” may have suggested the name “Sonne”. The derived, changing, subtle and chastened influence of the “Mund” may have suggested that of the “Maid”\textsuperscript{125}

Each character assimilates from surrounding circumstances that by which it is [which is by it] assimilable, rejecting the rest just as from earth and air the plant draws those elements which will serve it as food rejecting the rest

Lewes Life of Goethe ch. III\textsuperscript{126}

That poor circumstance
Called human life, - customs and bonds and laws
Wherewith men make a better or a worse,
Like children playing on a barren mound

\textsuperscript{125}. See above note 118.
\textsuperscript{126}. Lewes G.H., \textit{The Life and Work of Goethe}, London, Smith and Elder, 1864; book I, chapter III.
Feigning a thing to strive for or avoid

ye Spanish Gypsy p. 291

(In answer to a man interspersing many “said”’s in his account)

“O do without the ‘said’
Open thy mouth and pause in lieu of it.
I had as lief be pelted with a pea
Irregularly in the selfsame spot
As

… I shall be no more missed
Than waves are missed that leaping on the rock
Find there a bed and rest. Life’s a vast sea
That does its mighty errand without fail,
Panting in unchanged strength though waves are changing

The great avenging Angel does not crawl
To kill the serpent with a mimic fang
He stands erect, with sword of keenest edge
That kills [slays] like lightning

I have obeyed your word, have followed it
As water does the furrow in the rock

With the injustices of men as with the convulsions and disasters of nature, the longer they remain unrepaired, the greater become the obstacles to repairing them arising from the aftergrowths which would have to be torn up or broken through.  

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**Miscellaneous Quotations [46-73]**

T.W.  

Dugald Stewart is ‘inclined to believe that Adam Smith possessed a power not perhaps uncommon among absent men of recollecting in consequence of subsequent efforts of reflection many occurrences which at the time at which [when] they happened did not seem to have sensibly attracted his notice.’

Life of Adam Smith in Edition by McCulloch p. XIX

Stewart says ‘Smith considered every species of note as a blemish or imperfection, indicating either an idle accumulation of superfluous particulars, or a want of skill and comprehension in the general design.’

Ib p. XVII

There is an icelander’s legend that a gnome was ordered to build a snow-man on ground on which a hot spring was bubbling up. Even just as he was about to complete the head and shoulders the whole mass fell to the ground. The Daily Telegraph (Jan 14.67) compares his fate to that of the Emperor of Austria

A person complained to Gotthold that he had met with ingratitude. But Gotthold: ‘Did you ever see horses taken to water? They rush into some beautiful [stream] drink of it to their

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129. This annotation seems to match the reference to ‘Miscellaneous Quotations p. 1’ (see above note 51).

130. See above note 49.


133. The Daily Telegraph, 14.1.1867, p. 4.
heart’s content, then turn their backs upon it or trample it with their feet until the water is thick and muddy. But the noble river floats away the mud and continues after as it was before, full and free of access for the same or other thirsty creatures.

Sunday Reader I

Mr Bright and his school of Democrats thinks themselves greatly concerned in thinking maintaining that the franchise is what they term a right, not a trust. Now this one idea[,] taking root in the general mind[,] does a moral mischief far outweighing all the good that the ballot could do[,] at the highest possible estimate of it.


The one indispensable merit of a government in favour of which it may be forgiven almost any other amount of demerit compatible with progress is that its operation on the people is favourable, or not unfavourable, to the next step which it is necessary for them to take in order to raise themselves to a higher level.

Ib p. 14

The desire of vengeance which takes possession of the heart of savages resembles the instinctive fury [rage] of an animal rather than the passion of a man; it turns with undiscerning fury against inanimate objects. If struck with an arrow in battle they will tear it from the wound break it and bite it with their teeth and dash it on the ground

Robertson America I 351-2
Q[quote]d in D.Stewart VI 199.

The Alps themselves which your own poets used to love so reverently you look upon as soaped poles in a bear garden, which you set yourselves to climb and slide down again with shrinks of delight.

Ruskin. King’s Treasuries

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You have made railroads of the aisles of the cathedrals of the earth, and eat off their altars

That vulgar excitement which looked upon the granite of the Alps as an unoccupied advertisement wall for chalking names upon.

Buckle II 475-6
A philosopher should aim solely at truth and should refuse to estimate the practical tendencies of his speculations. If they are true let them stand, if they are false, let them fall. But whether they are agreeable or disagreeable, whether they are consolatory or disheartening whether they are safe or mischievous is a question not for philosophers but for practical men. Every new truth which has ever been propounded has for a time caused mischief; it has produced discomfort, and often unhappiness, sometimes by disturbing social or religious arrangements and sometimes merely by the disruption of old and cherished associations of thought. It is only after a certain interval and when the framework of affairs has adjusted itself to the new truth that its good effects preponderate, and the preponderance continues to increase until at length the truth causes nothing but good. [But, at the outset, there is always harm.] And if the truth is very great, as well as very new, the harm is serious: Men are made uneasy, they flinch; they cannot bear the sudden light; a general restlessness supervenes; the face of society is disturbed, or perhaps convulsed; old interests and old beliefs have been destroyed before new ones have been created: … It is the business of practical men to moderate these [such] symptoms and to take care that the truths which philosophers discover are not applied so rashly as to dislocate the fabric instead of strengthening it. But the philosopher has only to discover the truth, and to promulgate it; and that is hard enough work for any man, let his ability be what [as great as] it may. This division of labour between thinkers and actors secures an economy of force and prevents either class from wasting its power. It establishes a difference between science which ascertains principles and art which applies them. …

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139. Free quotation from Ruskin, ib.
140. Ruskin, Preface to the first edition of *Sesame and Lilies*.
duty of a philosopher is clear. … He must take every pains to ascertain the truth; and having arrived at a conclusion, he instead of shrinking from it because it is unpalatable or because it seems dangerous, should, on that very account, cling the closer to it, should uphold it in bad repute more zealously than he would have done in good repute; should noise it abroad far and wide utterly regardless [of] what opinions he shocks or what opinions [interests] he imperils; should on its behalf court hostility and despise contempt; being well assured that, if it is not true, it will die; but that if it is true, it must produce ultimate benefit, albeit unsuited for practical adoption by the age or country in which it is first propounded.

Buckle II 475-6

(His) Concessis, punctum esse quod nullam magnitudinem habeat: extremitatem et quasi libramentum in qua nulla omnino crassitudo est: lineamentum longitudinem latitudine carentem [liniamentum sine ulla latitude]

Cicero Acad[emicos] II 36\textsuperscript{142}

It is indeed the common fate of human reason in speculation to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as possible, and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the foundation is solid or not. Arrived at this point all sort of excuses are sought after in order to console us for its want of stability or rather indeed to enable us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous an investigation.

Kant Cr.[itique of P.ure] R.[eason] p. 6 Bohn\textsuperscript{143}

If the inferior animals have no cognisance of themselves (and there is no good reason to believe that they have none, although here no opinion is here offered on the point) in that case, with all their senses they are mere incarnate absurdities gazing upon unredeemed contradiction

\[ \text{Βλέποντεσ \ εβλεπον \ ματην} \]
\[ \text{κλύοντεσ \ ουκ \ ηκουον}. \]

Ferrier Inst[itutes] 271-2\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{142} Cicero, Contra Academicos, II, 36.
\textsuperscript{143} Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, London, Bohn’s Philosophical Library, 1860, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{144} Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysic, pp. 271-2. The Greek quotation is from Aeschilus, Prometheus Bound, 447-8: ‘Eyes they had and saw not; And ears they had but heard not’. 
Whether organisation alone could produce life and thought[,] we probably shall never certainly know[,] unless we could repeat Frankenstein’s experiment; but that our mental operations have material conditions[,] can be denied by no one who acknowledges what all now admit, that the mind employs the brain as its material organ


Laughter is incident most to them who are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much laughter at the defects of others is a sign of pusillanimity. For of great minds one of the proper works is to help and free others from scorn and compare themselves with the notable

Hobbes Lev[iathan] ch 6

Courage, verbal acuteness, command over the forms of argumentation and a popular style will make out of the shallowest man[,] with a sufficient lack of reverence a considerable negative philosopher. Such men have never been wanting in periods of culture[,] and the period in which Bentham formed his early impressions was emphatically their reign, in proportion to its barrenness in the more noble products of the human mind.

Mill Dissert[ations] & Disc[ussions] I 334

Of good there be three kinds; good in the promise i.e. pulchrum; good in effect as the end desired which is called jucundum, delightful [, and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable]: and as many of evil.

Hobbes Lev[iathan ch. 6]

146. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 27.
I return to my interrupted speculation of bodies natural; wherein (if God give me health to finish it) I hope the novelty will as much please, as in the doctrine of the artificial body it is used to offend. For such truth, as opposeth no man profit a pleasure is welcome to all

Hobbes Leviathan The last sentence

Luther stood not alone: no really great man ever stood alone. The secret of their greatness lies in their understanding the spirit of the age in which they live, and in giving expression with the full power of faith and conviction to the thoughts of millions.

Max Müller Preface to German Classics p. 25

Professorial knight errantry still waits for its Cervantes. Nowhere have the objects of learning been so completely sacrificed to the means of learning; nowhere has that Dulcinea - knowledge for its own sake - with her dark veil and her barren heart, numbered so many admirers, nowhere have so many windmills been fought and so many real enemies left unhurt as in Germany, particularly during the last two centuries.

ib p. 28

Buckle II 502

There is, in poetry, a divine prophetic power, and an insight into the turn and aspect of things, which, if properly used, would make it the ally of science instead of the enemy. By the poet, nature is contemplated on the side of the emotions; by the man of science, on the side of the understanding. But the emotions are as much a part of us as the understanding; they are as truthful; they are as likely to be right. Though their view is different, it is not capricious. They obey fixed laws; they follow an orderly and uniform course; they run in sequences; they have their logic and method of inference. Poetry, therefore, is a part of philosophy, simply because the emotions are a part of the mind. ... The magnificent generalizations of Newton and Harvey could never have been completed in an age absorbed in one unvarying round of experiments and observations. We are in that predicament, that our facts have outstripped our

151. Muller, German Classics, preface p. XXVII.
153. Marshall’s text has ‘speculations’.
knowledge, and are now encumbering its march. ... We want ideas, and we get more facts. We hear constantly of what nature is doing, but we rarely hear of what man is thinking. ... I can hardly doubt that one of the reasons why we, in England, made such wonderful discoveries during the seventeenth century, was because that century was also the great age of English poetry. ... Shakespeare and the poets sowed the seed, which Newton and the philosophers reaped. Discarding the old scholastic and theological pursuits, they drew attention to nature, and thus became the real founders of all natural science. They did even more than this. They first impregnated the mind of England with bold and lofty conceptions. They taught the men of their generation to crave after the unseen. They taught them to pine for the ideal, and to rise above the visible world of sense. ... Since the seventeenth century, we have had no poet of the highest order, though Shelley, had he lived, would perhaps have become one. He had something of that burning passion, that sacred fire, which kindles the soul, as though it came fresh from the altar of the gods. ... The noble English poetry of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is read more than ever, but it does not colour our thoughts; it does not shape our understandings, as it shaped the understandings of our forefathers. Between us and them is a chasm which we cannot entirely bridge. We are so far removed from the associations amid which those poems were composed, that they do not flash upon us with that reality and distinctness of aim, which they would have done, had we lived when they were written. Their garb is strange, and belongs to another time. Not merely their dialect and their dress, but their very complexion and their inmost sentiments, tell of bygone days, of which we have no firm hold. There is, no doubt, a certain ornamental culture, which the most highly educated persons receive from the literature of the past, and by which they sometimes refine their taste, and sometimes enlarge their ideas. But the real culture of a great people, that which supplies each generation with its principal strength, consists of what he learnt from the generation immediately preceding.

The antimaternalists seem to me to strengthen and encourage their adversaries by such arguments as this: “But then you leave the Soul nothing to do - you make it a sort of idle presence by which everything is said to be done, a sort of royal personage in whose name all is done. But then all being done through the brain and body, these are really what do all, and the supposition of the present soul is merely otiose.” But all this seems to me to be a mistake, and just the kind of mistake which gives possibility [of reason] to the materialist supposition.
The body does not do one sort of work and the soul another, so as that if we find the body doing all that we previously supposed the soul did, we have lost all reason for supposing the soul to exist. If the “soul” and “body” are the terms which we like to use, then the body is the instrument of the soul and it certainly is to a great extent an instrument of thought and knowledge. ... The supposition of the professed materialist is, that thought [it] is sufficiently described, as thought, by being called a modification of the more refined portions of the body.

Grote What is Materialism in Macmillan\textsuperscript{154}

The great art of genius is never to say too much and to avoid with equal anxiety a commonplace manner and matter that is not commonplace. Whenever he deviates into any originality of thought he takes care that it shall be such as excites surprise for its acuteness, rather than admiration for its profundity. He takes care [to] say rather that nature took care for him ... I believe that I could do all that Junius has done and surpass him by doing many things which he has not done, for example by an occasional induction of startling facts in the manner of Tom Paine and lively illustrations and witty applications of good stories and appropriate anecdotes in the manner of Horne Tooke. I believe I could do it if it were in my nature to aim at this sort of excellence, or to be enamoured of the favour and immediate influence which would be its consequence and reward. But it is not in my nature. I not only love truth, but I have a passion for the legitimate investigation of truth. The love of truth, conjoined with a keen delight in a strict [and skilful] yet impassioned argumentation, is my master passion, and to it are subordinate even my love of liberty and all my public feelings; and to it whatever I labour under of vanity, ambition, and all my inward impulses.

Coleridge Lit[erary] Remains vol. I, p. 248&\textsuperscript{155}

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<th>Germany</th>
<th>Genius</th>
<th>Talent</th>
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<tr>
<td>England</td>
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I define *genius* as originality in intellectual construction: the moral accompaniment and actuating principle of which consists, perhaps, in the carrying out [on] of the freshness and feelings of childhood into the powers of manhood.

By *talent* on the other hand I mean the comparative facility of acquiring, arranging and applying the stock furnished by others, and already existing in books or other conservatories of the intellect.

By *cleverness* I mean a comparative readiness in the invention and use of means for the realising of objects and ideas.

... In literature cleverness is more frequently accompanied by wit; genius and sense by humour

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<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Idea or Law anticipated</th>
<th>Totality</th>
<th>Distinctness</th>
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<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>Law discovered</td>
<td>Selection</td>
<td>Clearness</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Theory invented</td>
<td>Particularity</td>
<td>Palpability?</td>
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<th>Germany</th>
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<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitism</td>
<td>Contemptuous nationality</td>
<td>Ostentatious and boastful nationality</td>
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<td>Craving of sympathy</td>
<td>Inward pride</td>
<td>Vanity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enthusiasm and visionariness</td>
<td>Zeal, Zealotry</td>
<td>Fanaticism</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Past and the Future</td>
<td>The Past and the Present</td>
<td>The Present</td>
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</table>

Coleridge, the Friend Section II Ess.[ay] I. p. 282

... genius is but a continued attention

... genius is only a protracted patience

Helvetius

Buffon

---

156. Later corrected into ‘Englishman’ and ‘Frenchman’.
In the exact sciences at least it is the patience of a sound intellect when invincible which truly constitutes genius

Cuvier

The force of applying [an] attention, steady and undissipated, to a single object is the sure mark of a superior genius

Chesterfield

The above quoted in Hamilton Lectures I 258

Ruskin says of great artists “imagine all that any of these men have seen or heard in the whole course of their lives, laid up accurately in their memories as in vast storehouses, extending with poets even to the slightest intonations of syllables heard in the beginning of their lives and with painters down to minutes folds of drapery and shapes of leaves and stones, and over all this unindexed and unmeasurable mass of treasure, the imagination brooding and wandering but dream gifted, so as to summon at any moment exactly such a group of ideas as shall justly fit each other.” This is the explanation of their genius as far as it can be explained.

Lewes, Principles of Success in Literature Fortnightly I 587

Arnot. Laws from Heaven for Life on Earth

p. 15 Proverbs compared to concentrated essences used by travellers

‘The proverb may not present to the eye the appearance of the wisdom which it was originally made of, but a great quantity of the raw material has been used up in making one and that one, when skilfully dissolved, will spread out to its original dimensions

p. 41

The unconverted (having other work before them) have no time to be there (in the theatre)

158. Quotations from Helvetius (De l’Esprit, discours iii, ch. iv), Buffon (quoted by Ponelle, Manuel, p. 371), Cuvier (Eloge Historique de M. Haüy) and Chesterfield (Letters to his son, letter lxxxix) are given by Hamilton, Lectures, I, p. 258.


161. “Like those concentrated essences of food, which are so much used by travellers in our day, the proverb may not present to the eye …”
The converted (having other joys within them) have no inclination.\textsuperscript{162}

p. 139
It is not uniform experience that a man lives long in proportion as he lives well. Wickedness shortens life but God’s government is moral: it is not a lump of mere materialism. He will have men choose goodness for His sake and its own, therefore a slight veil is cast over its present profitability

p. 348 &
A man responsible for his belief, on same principles as in Butler’s \textit{Analogy}.\textsuperscript{163}

Die Nützlichkeit oder Fruchtlosigkeit (eines guten Willes) kam diesem Werthe weder etwas zu setzen noch abnehmen. Sie wurde glichsam nur die Einfassung sein um ihn in gemeinen Verkehr besser handhaben zu können, oder die Aufmerksamkeit derer, die noch nicht genug kenner sind, auf sich zu ziehen, nicht aber um ihn kennern zu empfehlen und seinen Werth zu bestimmen

\begin{quote}
Kant Grundlegung zur Met.[aphysik] der Sitt.[en] Erst.[er] Absch.[itt]\textsuperscript{164}
\end{quote}

\textit{Bridges France under Richelieu and Colbert}\textsuperscript{165}

Works written on the principle of exclusive nationality, useful as they may be as collections of material, have to the student of the science of history something of the kind of provincial or parochial records. Western Europe used to be regarded as a whole[,] united in medieval times by a common religious faith, united no less in modern times by a uniform system of industrial activity, of scientific study and aesthetic culture. [9-10]

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{162} ‘We have sometimes thought the matter of attending the theatre, and similar scenes of midnight merriment, might be profitably put in the form of a dilemma, thus: - The unconverted (having other work before them) have no time to be there. The converted (having other joys within them) have no inclination’.
\item \textsuperscript{163} The reference to Butler is not in Arnot’s book. Butler J.S.H., \textit{The Analogy of Religion}, part II, chapter 6.
\item \textsuperscript{164} The usefulness or fruitlessness [of a good will] can neither add nor take away anything from this value. It would be, as it were, only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce, or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs, or to determine its value. Kant, I. \textit{Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten}, Leipzig, Modes und Baumann, 1838, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{165} Bridges, \textit{France under Richelieu and Colbert}. Edinburgh, Edmonston & Douglas, 1866. The following quotations and page numbers are from this work.
\end{itemize}
Not only were the free burghers the rivals of feudal power, but by the mode in which they obtained their freedom they decomposed and modernized that power. Of the two elements of which feudal power consisted, aristocracy and monarchy, they allied themselves with one to inevitable ruin sooner or later of the other ... In England they united with the aristocracy against the Kings; in France with royalty against aristocracy. [...] In England the monarchical element of feudalism was exceptionally strong; then too there was a quasi feudal element, that of the Saxon gentry, who, sharing the oppression of their countrymen in the towns, shared their resistance and were ultimately joined by the great barons. Hence the peculiar character of the English constitution, aristocratic rather than monarchical, provincial rather than metropolitan, localized not centralized.

43. Stern, inflexible, massive, (he elsewhere calls his features Dantesque) far reaching, profound, pitiless, Richelieu could hardly have felt much personal sympathy for the wily supple, adroit, fair spoken man (Mazarin) to whom he entrusted his power.

59. The legists of France had from the time of St. Louis always supported the monarchical element of feudalism against the aristocratic. Guided by the tradition of the Roman Empire they felt that in the strength of the central power lay the surest guarantee that the forces of the nation should be concentrated to public and national purposes. [...] Richelieu found them strenuous supporters and indeed without them would have been powerless.

63. To Elizabeth and Cromwell; to Henry IV, Sully and Richelieu war and foreign conquest were no longer the primary occupation of rulers. War, when they engaged in it, was a necessary evil accepted only for the sake of peace. ... During the first 11 years after the death of Mazarin Colbert was supreme. Under his guidance the whole energy of the state was concentrated as it had never been before on a pacific development of its commerce industry and intellect. These are years which have given such lustre to the reign of Louis, the only years that can claim honourable mention in his history. During the remaining 43 years of Louis reign retrograde influences became gradually supreme. The influence of Louis eclipsing that of Colbert plunged France into a long series of aggressive wars; the Edict of
Nantes was revoked; the Jesuits worked their will and for the least 30 years of Louis life they turned France into a second Spain.

Poetry Dialogue [74-76]

A (to B who has been upholding the Modern School of Poetry against the Classic, and in modern times Browning against Tennyson, with all the uncompromisingness of youth): Perhaps you would not mind giving us your idea of what is essential for the highest kind of poetry.

B: Do you want an oration, or would you prefer a logically accurate description arranged under heads and chapters?

A: As you please, but begin somewhere. You say its subject must be man, directly or indirectly.

B: Undoubtedly, and man in the full power of his weakness, in the full glory of his humiliation, in the full triumph of his failures, in the full peace of the struggles, in the full life of his death.

{C (a boy): Yes, but I always thought that conundrums and charades were the best poetry in the Lady’s and Gentleman Diary.}

B (without looking round continues): If a poet claims for himself the place of man’s highest instructor, he must paint man emphatically as man, not as the angels, who [are] above, nor as the beasts, who are below a state of perpetual gearing and striving, but man as he lives in the strong energy of becoming - Goethe’s “werden”, like a bird beating its wings against the cage that confines it, with its eyes ever fixed on the measureless blue beyond.

A: Then you would have him exhibit the inner and the outer life of individual men, their thoughts and their actions.

B: He may do so, but this is not essential to the highest kind of poetry, nor even desirable. He should do it only as far as he finds it necessary in order to relieve for himself the burden of writing, or for others that of reading.

A: Then his field of operations is limited in extent, and if he will do much, he must mine deeply.

B: Yes. Deeply but not too deeply. He must not be ever running down vague and disconnected shafts ever too deep, nobody knows where. He must make up his mind to go to
a certain level and to work that level, to make galleries in it, and cross-galleries, so that
people can, if they choose, make it into a comfortable house. He must have plenty of
connexions with the stories above, and in short give every possible aid to those who would
see the mine well. But he must not bother himself to go below this floor. That he must leave
for others to do, who may come after him. In a word he must be, after his fashion, dogmatic.

A: I should not have expected you to make that restriction.

B: I dare say not. But I am so much afraid of his becoming vague and hesitating. The
poet’s trumpet must give no uncertain sound.

A: Now, we are getting on to the subject of his style. I thought you were not very
particular about that.

B: Nor am I. He may write in prose or in verse, whichever he likes best. And I do not
even care about each individual sentence being intelligible at the first time of reading it, or
even at the first time of reading the poem. But I do care about his having something to say
which is perfectly definite and intelligible. He must know what he means himself, and then
anyone else, who chooses to take the trouble, can find out what he means. If he is really in
earnest, he may be difficult, but he cannot be obscure; he may be cumbrous, but he must be
vigorous.

A: Then you neglect altogether what are called graces of style.

B: Yes. That is, I would not have a poet hampered by them. In so far as they are
obtrusive, they are simply odious. But in so far as they are natural, and therefore true, they not
only add to the pleasure of his readers, but, by increasing his attractiveness, increase also his
power.

And, mind you, among graces of style I do not count metaphors and illustrations. These
belong to the very essence of poetry, whose special duty is to give clear and strong
impressions. There is no means whatever by which this can be done so fully and forcibly as
by powerful illustrations. There are also of course what are called beautiful illustrations
which belong to the “graces of style” and are included in the judgment passed on them.

A: In fact you subordinate everything to the subject matter and to the purpose; but these
two things are not quite the same. In the subject matter, if not vagueness, yet at least some
gearing after fuller knowledge may be tolerated.166

166. At the end of this unfinished manuscript there is the following sentence, evidently added later: ‘Intended to
lead up to the acknowledgment of Kant as a thorough and great poet’.
Appendix

Books of philosophical interest which belonged to the young
Alfred Marshall and were given to Cambridge Libraries

Books in the Marshall Library (formerly the Departmental Library of Economics)

Flint, R. *The Philosophy of History*, vol. I only, Edinburgh and London, 1874
Grote, J. *An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy*, edited by John Bickersteth Mayor, Cambridge 1870
Hume, D. *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1793
Kant, I. *The Metaphysics of Ethics*, Edinburgh, 1869
Mill, J.S. *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, London 1865
Mill, J.S. *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy*, 2nd ed., London 1865
Mill, J.S. *Considerations on Representative Government*, London, 1865
Mill, J.S. *Three Essays on Religion*, London, 1874

Books in the Cambridge University Library and catalogue number:

Condillac, E. B. de *Le commerce et le gouvernement*, Amsterdam 1776, Marshall.d.50
Mill, J. S. *Considerations on Representative Government*, London 1865 Marshall.c.55 (2)
Mill, J. S. *An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy*, 2nd edn London 1865 Marshall.c.56
Books given to the Moral Sciences Board in October 1905. Full transcript of the document in Marshall’s handwriting:

‘Berkeley’s Works 5 vols, ed. Fraser; Locke’s Works 10 vols (Note the first three vols. Essay on the Understanding are interleaved, because I expected to lecture on it at least every other year for ever more!! ); Stewart’s Active and Moral Powers of Man (2 vols); Lewes’s Life & Mind 3rd edition, 2 vols; also his History of Philosophy 2 vols; Vol. I of Mind; Boole’s Laws of Thought; Venn’s Empirical Logic; Bentham’s Works vol. I being lost. [There are about ten or eleven others, I think, double columns. ed. Bowring]; Leslie Stephen’s Science of Ethics; a good many of Herbert Spencer’s Works; Spinoza’s Works ed. Willis; Whewell’s Elements of Morality; Green Prolegomena to Ethics.’ (Cambridge University Archive, Moral Science Board Minutes, Min.V.10, 25 October 1906, loosely quoted by Groenewegen 1995, p. 336)