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Abstract

This paper examines Adam Smith’s vision of family life and the role of the family in society as it stems from the \textit{Theory of Moral Sentiments}.

We first discuss textual evidences of Smith’s vision of gender differences and of the relationships between the sexes. Then we turn to TMS’s analysis of marriage and family life, exploring the importance of sentiments in strengthening family bonds and in fostering individuals’ moral education. Then we enlarge our perspective, considering Smith’s view on the role of the family within society, especially as market and non market relationships are concerned. Finally, we focus on Smith’s vision of the possible threats which life in Commercial societies may impose to family life, loosening parental ties and weakening those fellow-feelings which, according to Smith, play a paramount role in the moral education and proper behaviour of individuals in a free society.

On the whole this paper acts as a first step in a wider project which includes the \textit{Wealth of Nations} and focuses especially on economic issues regarding family life.

Keywords: Adam Smith; Moral Philosophy; Family; Gender; Education.

JEL Classification: A 13; B12; B31; I 20; J16

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Introduction

Adam Smith’s social philosophy has risen a growing interest in the last few decades. The publication of the Glasgow edition of his works and correspondence has contributed to foster a deeper evaluation of his social and moral philosophy, especially as it stemmed from his masterpiece in this field, i.e., *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. This paper aims to give a modest contribution along this quite impressive scholarly tradition. Our focus is on Adam Smith’s thinking regarding the family: what the family is, what its place in civil society and its role in the economic system, what its internal relationships are and ought to be.

Historians and scholars of classical economic thought have looked at family life in Smith’s writings mainly by making use of such categories as male-female relationships, women discrimination at home and in the labour market, demographic or consumption decisions. While providing far reaching insights into Adam Smith’s moral and economic thought, those researches pay little or no attention to family life as such. At the same time their concern is mainly on the *Wealth of Nations*, with little (or only ancillary) references to other Smith’s published works.

This gap cannot be completely ascribed to a lack of interest or accuracy on the part of historians: Smith’s scanty references to family life provide little basis for any systematic and clear-cut analysis of his thinking on this subject. In this paper we try to throw some light upon Smith’s own vision of the family as stemming from the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*.

Our main theses are that Smith developed a quite traditional view of gender differences and had little interest for (and low consideration of) love between the two sexes, which contrasts with the importance he attached to

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4 Concerning the economics of the family see for all Folbre (1996): an historical overview on the evolution of the family in Adam Smith’s times is provided by Trumbach (1977); Shanley (1979); Stone (1979); Goody (1983).
7 See Rosenberg (1969).
marriage, family life and education in his system of moral philosophy. Smith’s insistence upon sympathy and ‘humanity’ as the true foundations of moral behavior and education, assigns a crucial educative responsibility to women and provides a rationale for a quite conservative vision of their proper social role.

His analysis of the possible threats which life in a commercial society imposes on family life and the role he attaches to family and parental bonds within it provides a link between his moral philosophy and his economic theory, tracing out a protected space where the seek of profit and market mechanisms are not allowed to enter.

Our paper is structured as follows: sections 1 is devoted to describe Smith’s vision of gender differences and of the relationships between the two sexes (2). Then we turn to his analysis of marriage and family life, exploring the importance of authority and sentiments in strengthening family bonds (3). Then we widen our perspective, considering Smith’s view on the role of the family within society (4). In section 5 we focus on Smith’s view on education which can be considered a sort of extension or, perhaps, a counterproof of his vision of family life. Section 6 is devoted to compare Smith’s vision of the family with his own experience as stemming from his main biographers’ account. Finally we sum up our reflections, drawing some tentative conclusions.

1. Gender differences and relationships in TMS

In the overall plan of providing ‘an account of the general principles of law and government’ (TMS VII.iv.37), WN focuses on the means whereby men in society relate to each other in order to satisfy their material needs and, in doing so, given certain conditions, improve the well being of the Nation. TMS inquires instead the means whereby men are able to express moral judgments and inform their behaviour to those principles needed to entertain social relationships; these moral judgements both influence and depend upon historically changing customs, laws and institutions. We can therefore regard
TMS as a sort of basic and broader foundation for the analysis exerted by WN in a narrower field (Lindgren 1973).

Smith’s overall work must be placed in the enlightenment debate concerning the natural foundations of society and the problem of reconciling the affirmation of rights and autonomy on the part of individuals with the need of a stable and self reinforcing social order. John Locke, David Hume, Gershom Carmichael and Frances Hutcheson--Smith’s Mentor and predecessor at the University of Glasgow--were part of a tradition of ‘natural’ moral philosophy, looking for a system of principles available to every man, aside from any religious or metaphysical system (Hont and Ignatieff 1983; Mizuta, 1975; Rendall 1987).

Women and the family had their own place in this enlightened tradition: the affirmation of a set of natural rights for men logically raised the problem of the status of women. How far women could be considered naturally equal to men? Once rejected the authority of any religious or metaphysical law, how to explain (or eventually justify) women’s inferior role in society? Which rights ought to be acknowledged to them, and what consequences would follow for the stability of marriage, family and society? These were the problems that the Scottish moral philosophers were addressing and this is where Smith’s own treatment of the family in TMS and even LJ should be placed.

First of all we should notice that, contrary to Hutcheson’s family egalitarianism (Rendall 1987: 53), Smith’s own treatment of the status of women leaves no doubt on his acceptance of the form of subordination of women within family and society prevailing at his time. The rationale for this attitude could be traced on the concept of ‘propriety’ which is paramount in his system of moral philosophy. Moral judgements are formed through the use of ‘sympathy’ which is the ability to imagine what the feelings of another person are, by conceiving ‘what we ourselves would feel […] if we were in his case’. While our senses are not able to participate in his own senses, yet we can feel ‘something which though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them’ (TMS, I,1). Imagining how other’s feelings will be affected by our or other’s

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8 See Okin (1979); Shanley (1979); Elshtain (1981) and (2006); Rothschild (2001).
actions we are able to formulate a moral judgment on the propriety of those actions.

In Smith’s moral system sympathy is reinforced by the judgment of the ‘impartial spectator’, which can be regarded as a third person not directly involved or, more simply, as the form of wisdom prevailing in the social and cultural environment: ‘everyone is accustomed to think how others will judge his action and to act accordingly’ (Mizuta 1975: 122). Both a subjective tool (sympathy) and a conventional one (the impartial spectator) concur in allowing persons to judge of the ‘propriety’ of their or others’ actions.

Many of the examples provided by Smith in order to explain to his readers what ‘propriety’ is and how it should be applied, are related to gender differences: what propriety suggests or allows to men is often not the same for women; in other words, the same actions carried out by men or by women have different moral consequences⁹. The paramount example is about chastity: women’s violations of chastity are regarded much more seriously than men’s:

Chastity in the fair sex [is] a virtue of which [...] we are excessively jealous [...] Breach of chastity dishonours irrevocably. No circumstances, no solicitation can excuse it; no sorrow, no repentance atone for it. We are so nice in this respect that even a rape dishonours, and the innocence of the mind cannot, in our imagination, wash out the pollution of the body (TMS, VII.iv.13).(CIT)

According to Rendall (1987: 60), this unbalanced judgment would be grounded on the stronger sympathy of the ‘impartial’ spectator for the

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⁹ ‘To talk to a woman as we would to a man is improper: it is expected that their company should inspire us with more gaiety, more pleasantry, and more attention; and an entire insensibility to the two sex, renders a man contemptible in some measure even to the men.’ (TMS, I.ii.1.2). ‘Anger against a man is, no doubt, somewhat different from against a woman, and that again from anger against a child.’ (TMS, VII.iii.3.13); ‘The reserve which the laws of society impose upon the fair sex, with regard to this weakness, renders it more peculiarly distressful in them, and, upon that very account, more deeply interesting’ (TMS, I.ii.2.4); ‘A woman who paints, could derive, one should imagine, but little vanity from the compliments that are paid to her complexion. There, we should expect, ought rather to put her in mind of the sentiments which real complexion would excite, and mortify her the more by the contrast.’ (TMS, III.2.4).
jealously of the husband, but also on the injury to male’s authority which is at stake in women’s infidelity.\(^10\)

Moreover, according to Smith men and women display different vices and virtues.

(CIT) Humanity is the virtue of a woman, generosity of a man. The fair sex, who have commonly so much tenderness than ours, have seldom so much generosity. That women rarely make considerable donations, is an observation of the civil law. [Raro mulieres donare solet.] Humanity consists merely in the exquisite fellow-feeling which spectator entertains with the sentiments of the persons principally concerned, so as to grieve for their sufferings, to resent their injuries, and to rejoice at their good fortune. The most human actions require no self-denial, no self command, no great exertion of the sense of propriety. They consist only in doing what this exquisite sympathy would of its own account prompt us to do. We never are generous except when in some respect we prefer some other person to ourselves, and sacrifice some great and important interest of our own to an equal interest of a friend or a superior (TMS, IV.ii.10).

Whatever the origins of these differences (whether in nature, in culture or both) Smith doesn’t specify. Yet they bear important consequences in terms of respective social roles: men have a superior attitude towards public life, whereas women are more inclined to take care of household affairs, especially childrearing. After this brief description, Smith’s ideas on gender appear to be anything but radical: his own method of basically deriving them from the then prevailing customs and wisdom, prevented him to affirm revolutionary principles concerning social relationships.

At the same time his vision of gender differences and roles is coupled with an ‘affective’ view of marriage and family life, which makes sentiments paramount in shaping the relationships and judging of the propriety of actions.

At a first sight, Smith does not seem to regard the feelings arousing between men and women as a high example of virtue and social relationships. Smith analyses this subject in the sections devoted to passions deriving from

\(^{10}\) Rendall 1987: 63, based on LJB: 102-03 and LJA iii.3.
the body and to those deriving from imagination. First of all Smith points out that ‘all strong expressions of [...] the passion by which Nature unites the two sexes’ shall be regarded ‘upon every occasion indecent’ and must be actively contained by the virtue of temperance\textsuperscript{11}. Then in the treatment of passions deriving from imagination he analyses the reactions commonly observed at the hearing of romantic expressions of love such as those often displayed in literature or theatre. Love ‘though [...] perfectly natural’ is here regarded as a feeling which is difficult to sympathize with. All ‘serious and strong expressions’ of it are likely to be ridiculous to a third spectator\textsuperscript{12}:

\begin{quote}
(CIT) This is the case with that strong attachment which naturally grows up between two persons of different sexes, who have long fixed their thoughts upon one another. Our imagination not having run in the same channel with that of the lover, we cannot enter into the eagerness of his emotions. [...] The passion appears to everybody, but the man who feels it, entirely disproportioned to the value of the object; and love, though it is pardon in a certain age because we know it is natural, is always laughed at, because we cannot enter into it. All serious and strong expressions of it appear ridiculous to a third person; and though a lover can be good company to his mistress, he is to nobody else. (TMS, I.ii.2.1).
\end{quote}

The personal consideration which the lovers show (or pretend) to attach to each other is superior to the one that can be conceded by a third spectator. While this disproportion is ridiculous to the latter, it seems even to be dangerous to the lovers themselves, though with important differences between men and women, since ‘in the one sex it necessarily leads to the last ruin and infamy; and [...] in the other, where it is apprehended to be least

\textsuperscript{11} ‘It is the same case with the passion by which Nature unites the two sexes. Though naturally the most furious of all the passions, all strong expressions are upon every occasion indecent, even between persons in whom its most complete indulgence is acknowledged by all laws, both human and divine, to be perfectly innocent. [...] Such is our aversion for all the appetites which take their origin from the body: all strong expressions of them are loathsome and disagreeable’ (TMS, I. ii.1.2).

\textsuperscript{12} ‘Hence it is, that, in some modern tragedies and romances, this passion appears so wonderfully interesting. It is not so much the love of Castalio and Monimia which attaches us in the Orphan, as the distress which that love occasions. The author who should introduce two lovers, in a scene of perfect security, expressing their mutual fondness for one another, would excite laughter, and not sympathy’ (TMS I.ii.2.3).
fatal, it is almost always attended with and incapacity for labour, a neglect of
duty, a contempt of fame and even common reputation’ (TMS, I.ii.2.5).

Smith’s own vision of the relationships between men and women does not
seem indeed to concede very much to romanticism. He exerts a quite detached
observation of the consequences of this passion on the persons involved in it
as well as on the others. Anyway, love is ‘extravagantly disproportioned to the
value of its object’. The virtue of temperance (and the harsh irony steaming
from Smith’s own words) seems to be the only safe antidote against falling in
the depths of such an injuring passion.

Yet love is anything but a simple object, even to Smith’s analysis. Notwithstanding his quite negative attitude, Smith acknowledges that love
usually bears with it a set of secondary passions which are capable of being
sympathised with and, moreover, can be regarded as highly useful to life in
society.

(CIT) Of all the passions [...] which are so extravagantly disproportioned to the
value of their objects, love is the only one that appears, even to weakest mind, to
have anything in it that is either graceful or agreeable. In itself, first of all, though it
may be ridiculous, it is not naturally odious; and though its consequences are often
fatal and dreadful, its intentions are seldom mischievous. And then, though there is
little propriety in the passion itself, there is a good deal in some of those which always
accompany it. There is in love a strong mixture of humanity, generosity kindness,
friendship, esteem; passions with which, of all others [...], we have the greatest
propensity to sympathize [...].The sympathy which we feel with them, renders the
passion which they accompany less disagreeable, and supports it in our imagination
notwithstanding all the vices which commonly go along with it (TMS, I.ii.2.5).

We shall see in the next section that, as far as it is channelled in such
institutions as marriage and family, love can be redeemed from its vices and
becomes a source of outright virtues.
3. Family life, authority and affections

Drawing an example on what people commonly regard as an object of sympathy, Smith provides a brief description of a proper family life:

(CIT) The sentiment of love is, in itself, agreeable to the person who feels it. It soothes and composes the breast, seems to favour the vital motions, and to promote the healthful state of human constitution; and it is rendered still more delightful by the consciousness of the gratitude and satisfaction which it must excite in him who is the object of it. Their mutual regard renders them happy in one another, and sympathy, with this mutual regard, makes them agreeable to every other persons.

With what pleasure do we look upon a family, through the whole of which reign mutual love and esteem, where the parents and children are companions for one another, without any other difference than what is made by respectful affection on the one side, and kind indulgence on the other; where freedom and fondness, mutual raillery and mutual kindness, show that no opposition of interest divides the brothers, nor any rivalship of favour sets the sisters at variance, and where every thing presents us with the idea of peace, cheerfulness, harmony, and contentment? (TMS, I.ii.4.2)

This much more favourable assessment of love between a man and a woman differs to a significant extent from the one presented above. Love is named as the first among those social passions, which ‘a redoubled sympathy renders almost always peculiarly agreeable and becoming’ i.e. ‘generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship and esteem’ (TMS, I.ii.4.1).

Love between husband and wife can be a vital source of mutual ‘sympathy’ (in its proper Smithian sense) which exerts its beneficial effects first of all on their own family and then on their friends or even occasional visitors who can derive pleasure from their company, admire their ‘mutual love and esteem’ and ‘respectful affection’. Just the opposite feelings are aroused by entering ‘a house in which jarring contention sets one half of those who dwell in it against the other’ (TMS, I.ii.4.1).
Smith’s own vision of marriage and family life seems to attach a paramount relevance to feelings of mutual affection rather than authority. Though authority and sense of duty are not necessarily displaced by love and indulgence, yet Smith seems too insist on the latter as a source of moral bonds within the family. Even when father and mothers display love, tenderness or indulgence in a measure which is regarded to be excessive by a third spectator, nonetheless there is not any aversion to it, nor any condemnation, rather pity and regret for their unhappy fate.

It is always with concern, with sympathy and kindness, that we blame them for the extravagance of their attachment. [...] There is nothing in itself which renders it either ungraceful or disagreeable. We only regret that it is unfit to the world, because the world is unworthy of it. (TMS, I.ii.4.3)

Proper sentiments are the most efficient source of a proper behaviour, outside and within a family. After describing the situation of a man who has received great benefits from another man but feels compelled by his education alone to act benevolently and to show a grateful affection, Smith turns to the case of a wife:

A wife [...] may sometimes not feel that tender regard for her husband which is suitable to the relation that subsists between them. If she has been virtuously educated, however, she will endeavour to act as if she felt it, to be careful, officious, faithful, and sincere, and to be deficient in none of those attention which the sentiment of conjugal affection could have prompted her to perform. Such a friend, and such a wife, are neither of them, undoubtedly, the very best of their kinds; and though both of them may have the most serious and earnest desire to fulfil every part

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13 ‘The children of brothers and sisters are naturally connected by the friendship which, separating into different families, connected to take place between their parents. The good agreement improves the enjoyment of that friendship; their discord would disturb it. As they seldom live in the same family, however, though of more importance to one another, than to the greater part of other people, they are of much less than brothers and sisters. As their mutual sympathy is less necessary, so it is less habitual, and therefore proportionally weaker’ (TMS, VI.ii.1.5).

14 ‘We not only pardon, but love the maternal tenderness of Idame, who, at the risque of discovering the important secret of her husband, reclaims her infant from the cruel hands of the Tartars, into which it had been delivered’ (TMS, VI.ii.1.22).
of their duty, yet they will fail in many nice and delicate regards, they will miss many opportunities of obliging, which they could never have overlooked if they had possessed the sentiment that is proper to their situation (TMS, III.5.1).

Though it may be important and recommendable, sense of duty can act only as an imperfect substitute for sincere affection. Therefore a proper education should not be directed exclusively or primarily towards acquiring a proper sense of duty, but rather to feeling those sentiments of sympathy which can render a person able to judge and act properly in many different occasions with much more easiness and freedom.

According to Rendall (1987) the education of ‘moral sentiments’ is precisely the most important task which Smith entrusts to the family, and especially to women. As we have expounded, in Smith’s system of moral philosophy sympathy is the fundamental source of morality for the single individual as such: moral judgements are laid down on the basis of a sympathetic attitude on part of the individual, i.e., his capacity to feel or imagine how the other will feel as a certain action or condition takes place. Moreover maternal love can be considered a sort of archetype of sympathy:

What are the pangs of a mother, when she hears the moanings of her infant that during the agony of disease cannot express what it feels? In her idea of what it suffers, she joins, to its real helplessness, her own consciousness of that helplessness, and her own terrors for the unknown consequences of its disorder; and out of all these, forms, for her own sorrow, the most complete image of misery and distress (TMS, I.i.1.12).

As we noted above, one of the main differences between the virtues of men and women, is that, according to Smith, women can feel and express humanity at a degree which is unknown to men. Humanity is precisely the ability to feel how the others feel and act consequently with no resort to any type of intellectual calculation. Humanity is, thus, the immediate application of sympathy and its most powerful testimony. Women’s humanity is the reason why mothers are the best fitted to transmit sympathy to their children and
help them, with their own example, to acquire not simply humanity, but the more general and fundamental ability of sympathy which is, according to Smith, the very foundation of moral life.

4. Individual, the family and society in TMS

We stated in our introduction that Smith does not provide any systematic or prolonged discussion of family life. Now this sentence must be partially amended: he provided no such analyses till his last days. In 1790, after a couple of years of intense work, he made a thorough and overall revision of his TMS, providing a sixth edition which bears substantial changes and additions to the previous five.

One of the most important additions was the insertion of the entire Part VI, where Smith provides a link between his analysis of market economy, where self interest is the regulating (though not unique) force of relationship, and other spheres of human life, where other motives are prevalent. It is likely that Smith may have wanted to bridge a gap which could have caused misunderstandings and criticisms to his WN. Here a more systematic attention is devoted to family life and its relationships with society (TMS, VI.ii.1-2).

Smith’s treatment is organized in concentric circles, with the individual standing at the centre and relationships with other individuals weakening as the distance grows (Nieli 1986). Again the main regulating principle is sympathy.

Every man sympathizes first of all with himself, feeling immediately his own pleasures and pains better than any other can. This makes each individual chiefly responsible for himself.

Secondly everybody is concerned with his own ‘family, those who usually live in the same house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers and sisters’. These are ‘naturally the objects of his warmest affection’ and with them he is able to sympathize better than with any other person.

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15 Lord Shaftesbury’s view that ‘starting with self-love everyone can extend his affection gradually from self, to family, friends, community, and ultimately to the nation to which he belongs’ (Mizuta 1975: 116) may have influenced Smith’s formulation. The image of concentric spheres was repeated also by Hutcheson (see Mizuta 1975: 117). See also Sugden (...).
Smith regards even ‘The earliest friendships, the friendships which are naturally contracted when the heart is most susceptible of that feeling’ as close as brothers and sisters (TMS, VI.ii.1.4).

A third circle is represented by relatives, whose affection generally decreases with the remoteness of the relation: it is greater between children of brothers and sisters than between cousins and so on (TMS, VI.ii.i.5-6)\(^{16}\).

A fourth level is given by ‘colleagues in office, partners in trade’ who ‘call one another brothers; and frequently feel towards one another as if they really were so’ (TMS, VI.ii.1.15).

A fifth circle of people whom we are inclined to offer ‘small good offices [...] in preference to any other person who has no such connection’ are neighbours, who we use to meet quite every day, people who for their personal qualities we admire and esteem and those people who have made some good service to us and to which we are grateful (TMS, VI.ii.1.16-19).

(CIT) The general rule is established, that persons related to one another in a certain degree, ought always to be affected in a different manner, and that there is always the higher impropriety, and sometimes even a sort of impiety, in their being affected in a different manner. A parent without parental tenderness, a child devoid of all filial reverence, appear monsters, the objects not of hatred only but of horror. (TMS, VI.ii.i.7)

According to Smith’s point of view, when individuals do not have any sort of family bond or personal connection we tend to use, though for different reasons, a peculiar form of attention to ‘those who are distinguished by their extraordinary situation; the greatly fortunate and the greatly unfortunate, the rich and the powerful, the poor and the wretched’ (TMS, VI.ii.1.20).

Finally, in Chapter II, Smith examines individual’s benevolence for his own country, while Chapter III is devoted to ‘universal benevolence’. While the

\(^{16}\) The degree of sympathy and affection which an individual is able to feel for another person is not exclusively related to their parental relation. ‘Natural affection’, as Smith define it, is more the ‘effect of the moral than of the supposed physical connection between parent and the child’. Moreover ‘well disposed people’ could develop a strong feeling of ‘friendship not unlike that which takes place among those who are born to live in the same family’ (TMS VI.ii.1.14, 15).
latter can be regarded as a feeling reserved to the most virtuous men, the former type of benevolence has a direct connection with the individual’s own ‘selfish’ and ‘private benevolent affections’:

Not only we ourselves, but all the objects of our kindest affections, our children, our parents, our relations, our friends, our benefactors, all those whom we naturally love and revere the most, are commonly comprehended within [the country]; and their prosperity and safety depend in some measure upon its prosperity and safety (TMS, VI.ii.2.1).

From his quite extensive analysis of the role of family and other types of fellow feelings in society, Smith provides a quite general plan of the different approaches by which the life and proper behavior of an individual in society can be considered. Market bargaining is far from being the only proper relationship regulating the exchange of goods and services within society. What the proper way should be, it depends, as a general rule, on the level of intimacy and quality of mutual bonds people share among themselves.

Between wife and husband, parents and sons, brothers and sisters, relatives and friends we should be willing to offer a certain degree of offices, goods, help, without expecting any direct reward. Bonds of common sympathy, diffused reciprocity, respect and benevolence concur to explain our willingness to sacrifice our own time, work and wealth in order to satisfy the needs or desires of other people.

Also very interesting is Smith’s analysis of the consequences a modern society can imply for the preservation of those sort of feelings which can be regarded as proper within the family. Certain customs and social habits may hinder the maintenance of strong feelings of affection within and among generations and act as a potential danger to family bonds.

What Smith says about the expressions of mutual affections between wife and husband, he also applies to other parental relationships: when proper sentiments are lacking, sense of duty and proper education can provide an acceptable, though imperfect, resemblance of proper family affections:
Brothers and sisters, when they have been educated in distant countries, are apt to feel a similar diminution of affection. With the dutiful and the virtuous, however, respect for the general rule will frequently produce something which, though by no means the same, yet may very much resemble those natural affection. Even during the separation, the father and the child, the brothers or the sisters, are by no means indifferent to one another (TMS, VI.ii.1.8).

Smith observes how strictly proximity and affection are correlated. This is one of the reasons why in commercial countries, whose level of civilisation Smith otherwise decidedly exalted, the stability of family bonds can be endangered by the people’s enhanced mobility.

Yet, there is another reason why commercial countries are not favourable to the stability of family bonds. It is precisely the high level of civilisation accomplished in these countries that weakens one of the reason of traditional family bonds, i.e., that of protecting each member from the injuries and injustices perpetrated by members of other families. In pastoral or in backward countries each member of a family can expect to be safer as long as he lives close to his relatives: this common interest tends to enhance familiar bonds, encouraging a peaceful solution of familial conflicts and promoting feelings of affection even between remote relatives. With the affirmation of the authority of law this function of mutual defence could lose most of its importance and a relaxation of family bonds normally occurs (TMS, VI.ii.1.13).

It is precisely the relaxation of the material bonds within the family which is responsible for the crisis of the ancient type of patriarchal and extended family, in favour of the affirmation in commercial societies of a new type of social organization based on nuclear families.

5. Education and family bonds

The analysis of education, with its influence on moral behavior and professional skills as well, is an important bridge between the WN and TMS. We can see that, in both his main works, Smith devotes a careful attention to
describe the institutions and the contents of education. Smith’s harsh criticisms to public institutions for the education of the higher ranks of society should be coupled with his conviction that family control and affections play a crucial role in fostering the moral and professional education of individuals.

In WN Smith’s analysis of education is carried out in very different terms for the higher ranks of society and for the lower ones. While the latter is largely determined by labour market conditions and should be actively encouraged and provided by public institutions, the former falls under parents’ preferences and abilities.

Smith appears to be highly critical toward the established public system of education for ‘young people of fortune’. Not only he denounces the usage of the public to provide for the entire teacher’s salary as a serious encouragement to idleness and low quality of the teaching, but he regards also much of the education provided by public institutions and universities as largely outdated and useless for men in modern societies\textsuperscript{17}. Those institutions were originally intended to provide proper education for churchmen, and when people of the higher ranks of society sent their sons there to complete their studies, little or no change at all occurred in curricula. As a consequence universities were of little help in preparing young people to the ‘real business of the world, the business which is to employ them for the remainder of their days’ (WN, V.I.f.35).

This low consideration of universities and national public institutions is coupled with the outright condemnation of the then modern fashion of letting young men leave for a three or four year journey in foreign countries.

Nothing but the discredit into which universities are allowing themselves to fall, could ever have brought into repute so very absurd a practice as that of travelling at this early period of life. By sending his son abroad, a father delivers himself, at least

\textsuperscript{17} ‘Were there no publick institutions for education, no system, no science would be taught for which there was not some demand; or which the circumstances of the time did not render it, either necessary, or convenient, or at least fashionable to learn.[...] Were there no publick institutions for education, a gentleman, after going through, with application and abilities, the most complete course of education, which the circumstances of the times were supposed to afford, could not come into the world completely ignorant of every thing which is the common subject of conversation among gentlemen and men of the world’ (WN, V.I.f.46).
for some time, from so disagreeable an object as that of a son unemployed, neglected, and going to ruin before his eyes (WN, V.i.f.36).

Not only Smith minimizes the improvement in abilities and languages yielding from these journeys, but disapproves the consequences they usually have on a young man’s customs and habits:

(CIT) He commonly returns home more conceited, more unprincipled, more dissipated, and more incapable of any serious application either to study or to business, then he could well have become in so short a time, had he lived at home. By travelling so very young, by spending in the most frivolous dissipation the most precious years of his life, at a distance from the inspection and control of his parents and relations, every useful habit, which the earlier parts of his education might have had some tendency to form in him, instead of being riveted and confirmed, is almost necessarily either weakened or effaced. (WN, V.i.f.36)

It is perhaps depending on his own unhappy personal experience that Smith pronounces an outright condemnation of the custom, common to the upper class’ families, to send their young men and also women to attend their education afar from home:

(CIT) The education of boys at distant great schools, of young men at distant colleges, of young ladies in distant nunneries and boarding-schools, seems, in the higher ranks of life, to have hurt most essentially the domestic morals, and consequently the domestic happiness, both of France and England. Do you wish to educate your children to be dutiful to their parent, to be kind and affectionate to their brothers and sisters? put then under the necessity of being dutiful children, of being kind and affectionate brothers and sisters: educate them in your own house (TMS, VI.ii.1.10).

Again we can notice that proximity and parental control exert a paramount role in shaping infant and young people’s morality. Here, parental control is explicitly linked to the son’s capacity to employ his efforts and talents to the proper business and activities. The family has the prime responsibility in
making of his son neither an idle *rentier* nor an unprincipled adventurer, but a prudent man who is able to preserve and promote his own wealth and that of his family, in the new commercial society.

Yet it is apparent how far gender differences are implicitly accepted in Smith’s ‘master narrative’ (Sutherland 1995). The low estimation of modern institutions for men’s education, can easily be contrasted with the propriety of the education for women, which appears to be perfectly fit to its aimed ends.

(CIT)There are no publick institutions for the education of women, and there is accordingly nothing useless, absurd, or fantastical in the common course of their education. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it necessary or useful for them to learn, and they are taught nothing else. Every part of their tends evidently to some useful purpose; either to improve the natural attractions of their person, or to form their mind to reserve, to modesty, to chastity, and to œconomy: to render them both likely to become the mistresses of a family, and to behave properly when they have become such. In every part of her life a woman feels some conveniency or advantage from every part of her education. It seldom happens to a man, in any part of his life, derives any conveniency or advantage from some of the most laborious and troublesome parts of his education (WN, V.i.f.47).

Women’s education is here touched by Smith almost accidentally, as a useful counterproof to show how far inadequate the education provided to men could be.

In Smith’s narrative there is no doubt or even suspicion that women’s universe might ever be different from that which everybody knows. While men exert their own manifold virtues and skills upon a potentially worldwide and continuously changing business, women should be satisfied to be the mistress of the family. As in the former universe the ruling mechanism is the new political economy, in the latter the old œconomy can well suffice. A perfectly static and quite limited education is an accurate preparation to such a static and autarchic world, where no important change can occur. Reserve, modesty, chastity are the virtues which are needed to rule such a reign. Child bearing and rearing, moral and human education, household administration are first of
all the woman’s responsibility or, at least, occupation. It is in this limited field that a woman can exert her own virtues and talents and gain her own social standing.

Every successful business man is, after all, the yield of a careful mother. As long as the family is recognized as the cradle of every prudent man and generous citizen, women are given a role which the overall Smith’s reflection assures to be prominent. Probably, after more than two centuries, this well-ordered and harmonic picture of gender relationships and respective social roles, can hardly overcome our persistent scepticism.

6. The family in Smith and Smith’s own family

The peculiar perspective by which we have explored Smith’s moral philosophy calls for some further reflection, especially concerning the influence of his personal family experience on his vision of the family.

We don’t know much of Smith’s biography, especially as far as his private life is concerned. What we know comes from John Rae’s biography “Life of Adam Smith”, published for the first time in 1895. Dugald Stewart’s essay “Account of Adam Smith” (1793) and William Robert Scott’s “Adam Smith as Student and Professor”, published in Glasgow in 1937.

Adam Smith was the son of Adam Smith sr. and Margaret Douglas. Yet his father died in the very days when the child was born. His mother never married again and Adam was his only son. Neither Adam Smith ever married, but lived his whole life with his mother:

(CIT) His mother herself was from first to last the heart of Smith’s life. He being an only child, and she an only parent, they had been all in all to one another during his infancy and boyhood, and after he was full of years and honours, her presence was the same shelter to him as it was when a boy. His friends often spoke of his beautiful affection and worship with which he cherished her. One who knew him well for the last thirty years of his life, and was very probably at one time a boarder in his house, the clever and the bustling Earl of Buchan […], says the principal avenue to
Smith’s heart, always was by his mother. He was a delicate child, and afflicted even in childhood with those fits of absence and that habit of speaking to himself which he carried all through his life. (Rae 1965[1977]: 4)

Yet, despite the importance of the relationship between Adam Smith and his mother, little has been written on her. Aside from a few letters from Smith’s Oxford years\textsuperscript{18}, we are not in possession of any written documents that can testify the nature of their relation. Adam’s mother never wrote or at least did not leave anything we could possibly base an analysis on. What we know comes from recollections of Smith’s friends as accounted by his first biographers. Family friends confirmed the profound affection that tied Adam jr. to his mother.

Aside from his journey to France (1764-1766) and his frequent visit to London in 1773-1777, Smith never separated from his mother for prolonged periods in his adulthood.

In 1746, after having attended his studies in Glasgow and Oxford, Smith returned to Kirkcaldy in the mother’s house. In 1748 the Smiths moved to Edinburgh where Adam was appointed Professor of Logic and then of Moral Philosophy by 1951. Actually Smith and his mother were not alone: his cousin Jane Douglas lived with them ever since the days in Glasgow\textsuperscript{19}.

In 1767, coming back from France and London, Smith settled in Kirkcaldy where his mother and his cousin had returned a couple of years later\textsuperscript{20}. Those are reported to have been the happiest days of Smith’s life.

\textsuperscript{18} Some of these letters have been lost: ‘When [Lord] Brougham was writing his account of Smith he got the use of a number of letters written by the latter to his mother from Oxford between 1740 an 1746, which probably exist somewhere still, but which, he found, contained nothing of any general interest. ‘They are almost all’, he says ‘upon mere family and personal matters, most of them indeed upon his linen and other such necessaries, but all show his strong affection for his mother’. (Rae: 24-25).

\textsuperscript{19} ‘These houses are now demolished with the rest of the old college in Glasgow, so that we cannot mark the gradation of comfort that may have determined these successive changes; and besides they may have been determined by no positive preference of the economist himself, but by the desires of his mother and of his aunt, Miss Jane Douglas, who both lived with him at Glasgow, and whose smallest wishes it was the highest ambition of his affectionate nature to gratify’ (Rae: 50)

\textsuperscript{20} Rae: 239.
In 1778 he moved to Edimburgh, where he was to remain till the end of his life. His mother and his cousin followed him, together with the youngest of his cousins, David Douglas, which was later to be his sole heir21.

(CIT) His mother, who, though now in extreme old age, still possessed a considerable degree of health, and retained all her faculties unimpaired, accompanied him to town; and his cousin Miss Jane Douglas (who had formerly been a member of his family at Glasgow, and for whom he had always felt the affection of a brother) while he divided with him those tender affections which his aunt’s infirmities required, relieved him of a charge for which he was particularly ill qualified, by her friendly superintendence of domestic economy. (Rae: 509).

Mother’s presence was thus very important in Smith’s life. After her death, on the 23rd of May 1784, Smith wrote in a letter:

(CIT) I had just come from performing the last duty to my poor old Mother; and tho’ the death of a person in the ninetieth year of age was no doubt an event most agreeable to the course of nature; and, therefore, to be foreseen and prepared for; yet I must say to you, what I have said to other people, that the final separation from a person who certainly loved me more than any other person ever did or ever will loved me; and whom I certainly loved and respected more than I ever shall love or respect any other person, I cannot help feeling, even at this hour, as a very heavy stroke upon me (Letter to William Strahan, 10 June 1784, The correspondence of Adam Smith, E.C. Mossner and I.S. Ross (eds.), second edition, Calrendon, Oxford, 1987: 275).

The importance of Smith’s mother for his own work can hardly be underestimated. After her death, Smith seems to slowly let himself go, as if she was his only reason for living. He lived on for six more years, the most unproductive in his life. He was at the time revising the edition of WN and he was planning to complete a general ‘account of the general principles of law and government’ (TMS VII.iv.37). Though he was able to realize a complete

21 ‘David Douglas (later Lord Reston), Smith’s sole heir, usually referred to as Smith’s “nephew” or “cousin”, was the son of a nephew of Smith’s mother, i.e., the son of a cousin of Smith. He was nevertheless Smith’s nearest surviving relative’. (Viner 1965[1977]: 7).
revision of the TMS, the loss of his mother’s presence, followed shortly thereafter by the death of his cousin, and his health conditions held him back from accomplishing the rest of his plan.

The principal materials of the works he had announced had been long ago collected; and little probably was wanting, but a few years of wealth and retirement, to bestow on them that systematic arrangement in which he delighted [...] The death of his mother in 1784, which was followed by that of Miss. Douglas in 1788, contributed, it is probable, to frustrate these projects. They had been the objects of his affection for more than fifty years; and in their society he had enjoyed, from his infancy, all that he had ever knew of the endearments of a family. He was not alone, and helpless; and though he bore his loss with equanimity, and regained apparently his former cheerfulness, yet his health and strength gradually declined till the period of his death, which happened in July 1790, about two years after the death of his cousin, and six after that of his mother. (Dugald Stewart: 511)

Can this brief and scanty account of Smith’s family life, dominated by the presence of his mother, be of any utility in understanding Smith’s vision of the family?

It is evident that no clear cut conclusion can be traced out. Yet it is worth to highlight those aspects in Smith’s treatment of family life which bear some parallelism with his own experience as reported by his biographers.

First of all we noticed that while TMS (and far less WN) provides a very poor treatment of sex and marriage, it celebrates the virtues associated with family life. The focus of Smith’s analysis is rarely explicitly directed toward the relationship between the sexes. His views of gender differences and women’s role in society appear to be conservative and conventional. At the same time he assigns a crucial role to family life, as long as he retraced in it the source of the feelings and attitudes which he placed at the very foundation of moral behaviour. Some parallelism may be retraced with his own experience, where, as far as we know, the most important relationships with the feminine world were entirely bounded within the family and were vertical in nature, rather
than horizontal: the parent-children relationship is exalted both in Smith’s experience and writings.

Another aspect which may be regarded quite original in TMS’s vision of the family is the insistence upon feelings rather than rules as the proper object and sources of moral education. The role of humanity in education, which Smith regards prevalently as a female feature, contrasted with generosity, which is typical of the male, seems to find some parallelism with his own experience. A short citation from Stewart, which strikingly parallels with an above quoted passage of TMS (I.i.4.3), may support the idea that humanity and feeling of affections were, in Smith’s own experience, the main channel of education:

(CIT) His constitution during infancy was infirm and fickly, and required all the tender solicitude of his surviving parent. She was blamed for treating him with an unlimited indulgence; but it produced no unfavourable effects upon his temper or his dispositions: and he enjoyed the rare satisfaction of being able to repay her affection, by every attention that filial gratitude could dictate, during the long period of fifty years. (Dugald Stewart: 402)

A third point that we can highlight is the importance Smith attaches to proximity and parental control in education. His studies in Oxford may be the most important single experience of his life in which he forms his negative attitude against education in Colleges for young people, which is widely developed in TMS and WN. Moreover his own journey to France may have been an occasion to form his view about the effects of prolonged journey abroad on young people’s morality and ability to work.

Among the wide set of arguments he displays against education in college and journeys abroad for young people, we noticed that Smith attaches great importance to the absence of parental control and the loosing of those affections which are naturally connected with proximity. We can see from Smith’s own biography that this criterion of proximity was by no means a merely theoretical proposition, since it was deeply rooted in his own behavior.
His continuous effort to live as much as possible close to his mother is frequently indulged on by his biographers, especially John Rae.

The gaiety and fullness of city life were evidently much less to him than they were to Hume, and he must have found what sufficed him in the little town of his birth. He had his work, he had his mother, he had his books, he had his daily walks in the sea breeze, and he had Edinburg always in the offing as a place of occasional resort (Rae: 239). (...) His mother, his friends, his books – these were Smith’s three great joys. (Rae: 327)

Smith’s system of moral philosophy is the yield of a highly speculative mind, exceptionally endowed with an acute observer’s ability, continuously widened by his unbounded readings and trained by the dialogue with such eminent minds as Hume, Hutcheson, etc.

Yet we can affirm, with a fair degree of certainty, that his vision of family life (and also of moral life) was partially oriented by a set of criteria which was deeply rooted in his education and in the relationship with his mother.

**Conclusions**

Analysing TMS we have been exposed to the idea that family life plays an important role in Smith’s system of moral philosophy. According to Smith, moral behaviour does not need to be based on the imposition of a certain set of rules nor on the pursuit of some type of virtues which would be limited to aristocratic and well-educated people; neither the possibility of peaceful social relationships rest on the heroic assumption of an overly benevolent nature of human being, or in a complicated system of moral and civic education. The natural foundation of the individual’s morality lies in his ability to imagine and take part in other people’s feelings, which is to sympathize with them, and, more basically, in everyone’s desire to be sympathized with. Prior to the acquisition of a set of positive moral rules, parental love and care help children to develop their natural sympathy, which is the most important bond within family life, and, at the same time, its main educative task.
The importance of sympathy and affection in family life, provides a further explanation of Smith’s rather conservative and conventional vision of gender differences and relationship, and his insistence upon women’s social role to be confined within their houses, which was currently challenged by other philosophers and by his own master Hutcheson. In Smith’s vision the importance of a typical female character such as ‘humanity’ in the development of children’s moral attitudes assigns a crucial role in education to women, and implies them concentrating on child rearing and education, rather than on professional or public activities. Gender differences, family life and moral behaviour are strictly related in Smith’s vision and provide the most important support to the building up of a free and peaceful society.

Given the crucial role assigned to family affection in his system of moral philosophy we can better appreciate Smith’s own concern for the possible menaces which life in commercial societies may impose on family life and parental bonds. The need to reinforce these bonds by a proper education and the need to trace out a protected space where the seek of profit and market mechanisms are not allowed to enter, shows how far Smith was aware not only of the advantages but also of the risks associated with the rapid process of social transformation which was underway. While he decidedly favoured the development of capitalistic and commercial society, he was convinced that this new form of social organization could survive itself only if supported by a system of public morality and of non-market social relationships which had their foundation in family life and affection.
References


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Women in the Theory of Moral Sentiments: Some Evidence from Textual Occurrences
Pierluigi Nuti

1. I have read through The Theory of Moral Sentiments from the beginning to the end in search for references to woman, finding a total of 117. I can not be too sure not having possibly missed out a small number (1 or 2) of them, even though I esteem my work fairly accurate.

References I searched for occurred with a very low frequency. The target word that occurred the highest number of times was “her” (23 in the whole book), followed by “sex” (9), children (10) and woman (9).

The word “sex”, just mentioned, appeared a total of nine times in TMS, eight referring to gender and once meaning sexual activity.

The word “family” appears four times in the whole of TMS, along with “domestic” (twice). Other meaning family names occurring are “sister” (7 times), “parent” (4 times) and “daughter” (once). “Married”, “conjugal” and “maternal” also appear once each in Smith’s work. The term “friend” or “friendship” tied in meaning to woman comes up twice, in one case together with the word “wife” and in an other referring to the relationship between brothers and sisters. “Wife” appears a total of four times, while “ladies” is mentioned merely once. Also mentioned once is the term “mother”. Nor can we expect much more from the pronoun “she”, present only six times. Figuring scarcely throughout the entire TMS are also “virgin” (once) and “nurse” (once). Other more distant, but not for this more present, evidences of sentiments, feelings or impulses somehow related to the sphere of womanly existence are “love” (11), “passion” (5), “affection” (2), “lovers” (1), “sympathize” (1), “rape” (1), “seduction” (1), “Monimia” (1), “Phaedra” (1), “Joanna of Castile” (1), “Palmira” and “Idame” (1).

List of words present in TMS:
“Her”: I.i.1.12 (5 times), I.ii.2.4 (5 times), III.2.4 (3 times), III.2.13, III.3.33 (5 times), III.5.1 (twice).
“Sex”: I.ii.1.2, I.ii.2.1, I.ii.2.4, I.ii.2.5, II.i.5.10, IV.2.10, IV.ii.11, VII.4.13, VII.ii.4.11 (twice).
“Child” or “children”: I.ii.4.2, III.3.22, V.ii.15, VI.ii.1.10 (twice), VI.ii.1.14 (twice), VI.i.2, VII.i.1.28, VII.iii.3.13.
“Woman”: I.ii.1.2, I.ii.3.5, II.iii.2.4, III.2.4, III.2.13, IV.2.10, VII.i.1.28, VII.iii.1.4, VII.iii.3.13.
“Mother”: I.i.1.12
“Family”: I.ii.4.2, III.6.10, VI.ii.1.5, VI.ii.1.13.
“Infant”: I.i.1.12, VI.i.1.22.
“Herself”: III.3.33.
“Domestic”: VI.ii.1.10, VII.i.1.28.
“Sister”: I.ii.4.2, V.ii.1.5 (twice), VI.ii.1.8 (twice), VI.ii.1.10 (twice).
“Parent”: I.ii.4.2, VI.ii.1.5, VI.ii.1.10, VI.ii.2.
“Daughter”: V.2.21.
“Married”, “conjugal” and “maternal”: II.iii.2.4; III.5.1, VI.ii.1.22.
“Friend”: III.5.1
“Friendship”: VI.ii.1.5.
“Ladies”: VI.ii.1.10.
“She”: I.i.1.12 (twice), III.3.33, III.5.1 (3 times).
“Virgin”: III.2.13.
“Nurse”: III.3.22.
“Love”: I.ii.2.3 (twice), I.ii.2.4 (twice), I.ii.4.2, I.iii.2.7 (twice), II.i.5.10, VI.ii.1.22, VI.ii.2, VII.i.4.11 (twice).
“Passion”: I.ii.2.3, I.ii.2.4, II.i.5.10, III.6.12, VII.i.4.11.
“Affection”: I.ii.2.4, VI.ii.1.8.
“Lovers”: I.ii.2.3.
“Sympathize”: VII.iii.1.4.
“Rape”: II.iii.2.4.
“Seduction”: II.iii.2.4.

2.

My research has been undeniably a hard one, since the target word occurred with such a low frequency, it was difficult to keep the attention level high.
The pronoun *her* comes up, as already said, 23 times, in changing contexts. In the following part we will show what nouns it takes the place of.

*Her*: I.i.1.12 “the mother’s” (5), I.ii.2.4 “Phaedra” (5), III.2.4-III.3.13 “woman” (4), III.3.33 “Joanna of Castile” (5), III.5.1 “wife” (2), VI.ii.1.22 “husband” and “infant”.

The word “sex” appears in nine different situations, usually with the meaning of gender.

*Sex (1)*: I.i.1.2 “to the two sex”, I.ii.2.1 “of different sexes”, I.ii.2.4 “the fair sex”, I.ii.2.5 “in the one sex”, II.i.5.10 “the two sexes”, IV.ii.10 “the fair-sex”, V.ii.11 “more fearful sex”, VII.iv.13 “the fair sex”.

*Sex (2)*: VII.ii.4.11 “the inclination to sex” and “the love of sex”.

*Child or children*: I.ii.4.2 “parents and children”, III.3.22 “a very young child”, V.ii.15 “the children of brothers and sisters”, VI.ii.1.10 “educate your children”, VI.ii.1.14 “the child’s having been educated”, VI.ii.2 “our children, our parents”, VII.ii.1.28 “man, woman and child”.

*Love or affection*: I.ii.2.3 “It is not so much the love of Castalio and Monimia” and “as the distress which that love occasions”, I.ii.2.4 “the love of Phaedre” and “the situation of love”, I.ii.4.2 “mutual love” and “respectful affection”, I.iii.2.7 “Love, […] is commonly succeeded” and “succeeded by love”, II.i.5.10 “the love of pleasure”, VI.ii.1.8. “diminution of affection”, VI.ii.1.22 “love the maternel tenderness of Imade”, VI.ii.2 “all those whom we naturally love”, VII.ii.4.11 “love of pleasure” and “love of sex”.

*Woman*: I.ii.1.2 “to talk to a woman”, I.ii.3.5 “Women, and men of weak nerves”, II.iii.2.4 “seduce a married woman”, III.2.4 “a woman who paints”, III.2.13 “a woman of gallantry”, IV.2.10 “the virtue of a woman”, VII.ii.1.28 “man, woman and child”, VII.iii.1.4 “sympathize with a woman in child-bed”, VII.iii.3.13 “anger […] against a woman”.

*Sister or sisters*: I.ii.4.2 “sets the sisters at variance”, V.ii.1.5 (twice), VI.ii.1.8 and VI.ii.1.10 (twice) “brothers and sisters”.

33
Family or domestic: I.ii.4.2 “look upon a family”, III.6.10 “the peace of the family”, VI..ii.1.5 “into different families”, VI..i.1.10 “domestic happiness”, VI..i.1.13 “of the same family”, VII..i.1.28 “domestic slavery”.

She: I..i.1.12 “mother” (twice), III..3.33 “Joanna of Castile”, III..5.1 “wife” (3 times).

Wife: III..5.1 “A wife [...] may not feel”, III..5.11 “a barbarous and faithless wife”, III..6.10 “he corrupts the wife”, VI..i.1.14 “the offspring of his wife’s infidelity”.

Passion: I..i.2.3 “this passion appears so wonderfully interesting”, I..i.2.4 “all the secondary passions”, II..i.5.10 “the passion which unites the two sexes”, III..6.12 “the worst of human passions”, VII..ii.4.11 “vicious and offensive degree of those passions”.

Monimia, Phaedra, Joanna of Castile, Palmira and Ima: I..i.2.3 “The love of [...] Monimia”, I..i.2.4 “The love of Phaedra”, III..3.33 “The greatest Joanna of Castile”, III..6.12 “The unhappy [...] Palmira”, VI..i.1.22 “but love [...] of Ima”.

Parents: I..ii.4.2 “where the parents and children are companions”, VI..i.1.5 “between their parents”, VI..i.1.10 “to be dutiful to their parent”, VI..i.2 “our children, our parents”.

Married, conjugal or maternal: II..iii.2.4 “to seduce a married woman”, III..5.1 “the sentiments of conjugal affection”, VI..i.1.22 “the maternal tenderness”.

Infant: I..i.1.12 “the moanings of her infant”, VI..i.1.22 “[the] reclaims her infant”.

Herself: III..3.33 “attended it almost constantly herself”.

Mother: I..i.1.12 “what are the pangs of a mother”.

Ladies: VI..ii.1.10 “of young ladies in distant nunneries”

Daughter: V..2.21 “You shall no longer have a daughter”

Rape: II..iii.2.4 “The attempt to ravish is not punished at all as rape”

Seduction: II..iii.2.4 “though seduction is punished severely”

Virgin: III..2.13 “a mortal stab to an innocent virgin”

Nurse: III..3.22 “the attention of its nurse”. 
**Friend:** III.5.1 “Such a friend, and such a wife”.

**Friendship:** VI.ii.1.5 “Brothers and sisters [...] the enjoyment of that friendship”.

**Sympathize:** VII.iii.1.4 “A man may sympathize with a woman in hild bed”.

**Lovers:** I.ii.2.3 “The author who should introduce two lovers”.

3.

As I already stated, the frequency with which target words came up was very low. It would have been possible to skip entire paragraphs for there was no reference to be found.

The word “woman” is named twice in the first and in the third part of the book, three times in the seventh and once each in the second and in the fourth.

I. ‘Of the Propriety of Action’ – I.ii. ‘Of the degrees of the different passions which are consistent with propriety’ – I.ii.1.2 ‘Of the passions which take their origin from the body’. “Their (women’s) company should inspire us with more gaiety”. Smith seems to state that to derive pleasure from a member of the opposite sex is natural and hence consistent with propriety.

In section two of the first book Smith gives us five different categories of passion:

I.ii.1 passions that derive from the body (1) I.ii.2, passions that come from the imagination (Such as the strong attachment which grows up between two people of different sexes, this particular sort of feeling we are not inclined to sympathise with); I.ii.3, unsocial passions, with regard to these our sympathy is divided between the person who feels them and the person who is the object of them (anger and resentment). “Women, and men of weak nerves, tremble” ... putting themselves in the situation of the person who is so (in fear); I.ii.4, “... social Passions”, all the social passions, when expressed in the countenance of behaviour, please the indifferent spectator (double sympathy), “with what pleasure do we look upon a family ...”; I.ii.5 selfish passions, holds a middle place between social and unsocial passions.
In the second book we find two references, one in the first section (passion ... two sexes) and one in the third (married woman).

II.i ‘Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the objects of Reward and Punishment’. II.i.5 ‘The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit’ (Here Smith provides an explanation for propriety of conduct and sense of merit, thus as follow “two distinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent, and the indirect sympathy with the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions”, and then “[t]hough man, therefore be naturally endowed with a desire of the welfare and preservation of society”. II.ii ‘Of Justice and Beneficence’. II.iii ‘Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions’. II.iii.1 ‘Of the causes of this Influence of Fortune’ – II.iii.2 ‘Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune’, (here there is a parallelism between the house-breaker and the seducer, in an attempt to show how fortune can play a decisive role when premeditation of action is not completed. This section deals with the effects of fortune that can determine an “increase in our sense of the merit or demerit of actions”). II.iii.3 ‘Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments’.

III. ‘Of the Foundation of Judgement concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty’. III.2.4 ‘Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness’. Groundless compliments, we are shown, will not meet with a woman’s vanity. III.2.13 Who is really guilty will stand imputation better than the innocent.

IV. ‘Of the EFFECT of UTILITY upon the Sentiments of Approbation’. IV.2.10 ‘Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation’. Humanity (for the fair-sex) and generosity (for man), utility, beauty and approbation (raro mulieres donare solet).

VII. ‘Of Systems of MORAL PHILOSOPHY’. VII.ii ‘Of the different Accounts which have been given on the Nature of Virtue’. VII.ii.1.28 ‘Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety’. In this chapter Smith explains the
Stoic attitude towards death, something ancient Greeks were frequently exposed to, as for domestic slavery (also regarding women and children). VII.iii ‘Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation’. VII.iii.1 ‘Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love’. In this passage we have: VII.iii.1.4 “Sympathy can by no means be regarded as a selfish principle [...] I not only change circumstances, I also change person and character [when I sympathize], a man can sympathize with a woman in child-bed; though it is impossible that he should conceive himself as suffering her pains in his proper person and character. VII.iii.3 ‘Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation’. In VII.iii.3.13 the nature of approbation is discussed: “Anger against a man is, no doubt, somewhat different from anger against a woman, and that again from anger against a child. [...] If approbation and disapprobation, therefore, were, like gratitude and resentment, emotions of a particular kind, distinct from every other, we should expect that in all the variations which either of them might undergo, it should still retain the general features which mark it to be an emotion [...].